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ABSTRACT
Regret is a deeply contested emotion within abortion discourse.
It is present in ways that we are both afraid of and afraid to talk
about. Conventional pro-life and pro-choice narratives link regret to
defective decision making. Both sides assert that the existence of re-
gret reveals abortion’s harmfulness or harmlessness, generating a nar-
row focus on the maternal-fetal relationship and women’s “rights.”
These incomplete, deeply flawed constructions mire discourse in a
clash between regret and relief and exclude myriad relevant relation-
ships. Moreover, they distort popular understandings of abortion
that in turn influence women, creating cognitive dissonance and
perhaps distress for those with different lived experiences of abortion.
Finally, these portrayals contribute to the silence and stigma sur-
rounding abortion.
This Article contends that regret is more suggestive of women’s
deep reflection on the abortion decision and respect for the fetal rela-
tionship than of flawed decision making—signifying autonomy, not
victimization. It explains why we view regret as an outcome of defi-
cient decision making, how this conception misrepresents regret and
confuses it with remorse, and why it prompts liberals and conserva-
tives alike to devalue women’s autonomy. This Article charts a
course for reconceptualizing and ultimately decentering regret by dis-
cussing several common missteps in current constructions: (1) con-
flating regret with psychopathology, (2) confusing regret with
remorse, (3) confining regret to the maternal-fetal relationship and
women’s self-commitment, (4) linking regret to deficient decision
making, and (5) coupling regret and moral culpability. Finally, this
Article discusses how correcting these errors reprioritizes autonomy
and profoundly impacts abortion regulation.
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In the years since Gonzales v. Carhart, we as legal scholars have spilled
much ink lambasting the Supreme Court’s infamous characterization of
women’s regret of “late-term” abortion. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, forged an unfortunate and indelible link between regret, grief, and
fatally defective decision making:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond
of love the mother has for her child. . . . Whether to have an
abortion requires a difficult and painful moral deci-
sion. . . . While we find no reliable data to measure the phenom-
enon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come
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to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained. . . . The State has an interest in ensuring so grave
a choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who
comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after
the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor
to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her
unborn child, a child assuming the human form.1
We have criticized the majority’s shoddy use of social science re-
search,2 contested the opinion’s misunderstanding of regret as a psychologi-
cal concept, condemned its image of women as emotional reproductive
decision makers, and censured its abandonment of trust in women’s auton-
omous capacity.3 We have, in short, taken great pains to castigate all that is
regrettable about this post-abortion regret construction. There are at least
two key points, however, that have received insufficient analysis. First, regret
is not merely an individual’s introspective evaluation but a socially embed-
ded, relationally mediated emotion. Second, regret is not simply an ap-
praisal of past decisions’ wrongness or flawed processes; it also can reflect a
well-considered decision autonomously made. Regret is there in women’s
lived experiences of abortion, but not in ways that we should be afraid of, or
afraid to talk about. Yet, current understandings of regret can wreak griev-
ous harm, as in Gonzales or, perhaps more perniciously, in state legislation
allowing women to sue abortion providers for emotional distress or regret
following an abortion, even after signing an informed consent form, thereby
codifying and legitimating “abortion regret.”4
1. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
2. See Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV.
1255, 1257–60 (2012) (questioning the accuracy of “in house” fact-finding by the
Supreme Court in Carhart and other abortion cases); Maya Manian, The Irrational
Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 223, 254–57 (2009) (questioning the use of social science evidence in
Carhart).
3. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
255 (2011); Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Re-
gret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 877 (2008); Rebecca E. Ivey, Note, Destabilizing Discourses:
Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1451 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Lecture, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Con-
flict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641
(2008); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Ratio-
nale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2008).
4. An Iowa bill sponsored by Republican Greg Heartsill would allow a woman to sue an
abortion provider “to recover damages for any . . . emotional distress . . . proximately
caused as the result of the physician’s negligence or failure to obtain informed con-
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In popular understandings of abortion decision making, two contra-
dictory mainstream narratives5—“pro-life” and “pro-choice”—profoundly
influence our comprehension of the abortion decision-making process, what
reasons and relationships should be accorded great weight, and what emo-
tions should be felt most palpably. Pro-life and pro-choice narratives6 create
an invidious dichotomy in our constructions of abortion decision making
and women as decision makers; in the former, they are construed as victims,
in the latter, autonomous decision makers.7 Both perspectives strategically
use regret to indicate that abortion is harmful or harmless, yielding a tug-of-
war between regret and relief.8 The pro-life narrative rejects relief while the
pro-choice narrative shortchanges regret; the former claims women who
abort experience a toxic emotional cocktail including regret, often jeopardiz-
ing mental health, while the latter contends women do not regret abortions,
feel relief in lieu of regret, or are not clinically distressed.9 These stereotypi-
cal perspectives focus on two relationships—for pro-life narratives, the ma-
ternal-fetal relationship, and for pro-choice narratives, the woman’s
relationship to her own needs, values, and life goals (as in the advocacy
phrase “My Body, My Choice”)10—paying insufficient attention to other
relationships with romantic partners, existing or future children, friends,
family, religious leaders, and others whose opinions, needs, or fates inevita-
bly influence the decision-making process. In short, both narratives mobil-
sent prior to an performance of the abortion.” H.R. 2098, 113th Cong. (Iowa
2014), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=bill
info&Service=Billbook&menu=false&hbill=HF2098. The language provides that
“the signing of a consent form by the woman prior to the abortion shall not negate
the cause of action.” Id.
5. These narratives are social scripts that function like stereotypes or caricatures. They
are unlikely to represent the actual pro-life and pro-choice activist platforms, but
instead represent the simplified understandings of these platforms that have trickled
into popular culture. See infra note 13.
6. I use these terms because they are the terms traditionally chosen by both parties. See
WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION
WAR 3–4 (2003).
7. It may be controversial to refer to women as “victims” in either context, however,
pro-life activists characterize women as victims in two senses: that their abortion
choice is not an actual choice because the decision is coerced by others (from family
members and friends to abortion providers who do not effectively educate women)
and that abortion is traumatic for women. ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF
PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 143
(2008).
8. See generally Tracy A. Weitz et al., Editorial, You Say “Regret” and I Say “Relief”: A
Need To Break the Polemic About Abortion, 78 CONTRACEPTION 87 (2008).
9. Katrina Kimport, (Mis)Understanding Abortion Regret, 35 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
105, 106 (2012).
10. Jeannie Ludlow, Sometimes, It’s a Child and a Choice: Toward an Embodied Abortion
Praxis, 20 NWSA J. 26, 35 (2008).
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ize arguments and construct experiences around regret, using it to signal
when and why decision-making processes are deficient and positioning re-
gret so that it always reflects a lack of autonomy.
These narratives have an especially intense impact on the women mak-
ing this decision, who can experience psychological or emotional dissonance
or even distress upon discovering that their lived experience does not match
either narrative. Unfortunately, this is the case for many, if not most, of
women’s lived experiences. To right regret, we must reassess its moral value,
which is intertwined with the moral weight of the abortion event and the
moral fitness of women who choose it.
Just because a woman experiences regret after her abortion does not
mean she has made the wrong decision, was thinking solely of her own
interests, has rejected the fetal relationship, or failed to exercise autonomy.
Regret more likely signifies a woman’s deep reflection upon the abortion
decision, the value she placed upon the fetal relationship and other primary
relationships in her life, and her decision’s autonomous nature. We can bet-
ter accommodate women’s actual lived experience of the abortion decision
through relational autonomy, expanding it beyond the stereotypical exam-
ples of women who later regret ending their pregnancies and women who
terminate their pregnancies and feel relief. Significantly, a relational perspec-
tive accommodates various more nuanced (and more common) scenarios,
including women who wanted to pursue the maternal-fetal relationship but
on different terms; women who ended the maternal-fetal relationship to
protect other relationships with the already born, unborn, or yet-to-be con-
ceived; and women who recognize that something precious is lost and
mourn fetal life but do not grieve the maternal relationship.
This Article makes several novel contributions. It contends that regret
is more suggestive of women’s deep reflection on the abortion decision and
respect for the fetal relationship than of flawed decision making—signifying
autonomy, not victimization. It explores both how we have developed this
narrow view of regret as the outcome of deficient decision making and how
current conceptions of autonomy warp our understandings of this emotion.
It deconstructs mainstream pro-life and pro-choice understandings of regret
and relationality, demonstrating how they mischaracterize women’s diverse
lived experiences and actually undermine women’s autonomy. Applying a
relational autonomy model, this Article identifies and corrects several mis-
takes in conventional regret constructions. While current pro-life and pro-
choice scripts offer perspectives where women are either non-autonomous
victims or autonomous agents, regret—viewed relationally—shows how
women can be “both/and” or “neither/nor.” This Article explores these new
strategies, focusing not on whether women should be labeled as victims or
autonomous decision makers, but on how best to improve cultural, social,
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political, and legal environments so that more women are more autonomous.
Correcting these mistakes decenters regret and prioritizes autonomy—a tec-
tonic shift with significant consequences for existing legal abortion
regulations.
In Part I, this Article explains how most women’s lived experiences of
the abortion decision are influenced by, but differ from, stereotypical pro-
life and pro-choice conceptions of the abortion decision-making process. It
then outlines how relational autonomy can correct these problems by con-
trasting this framework with a traditional liberal autonomy model, illustrat-
ing how relationality more effectively captures regret’s roles in the abortion
decision. In Part II, this Article applies a relational model to expose several
common mistakes: (1) conflating regret as an emotion with psychopathol-
ogy, (2) confusing regret with remorse, (3) confining regret to the maternal-
fetal relationship and women’s self-commitment, (4) coupling regret with
deficient decision making, and (5) linking regret to moral culpability. Fi-
nally, this Article discusses how correcting these mistakes decenters regret
and emphasizes autonomy, and it explores this project’s profound implica-
tions for existing abortion regulations.
I. REPROVING REGRET: APPLYING A RELATIONAL CRITIQUE
A. How Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Narratives Influence Women’s Experience
of Abortion Decision-Making
Popular understandings of how women make abortion decisions and
with what consequences evolve from two mainstream narratives or “scripts”
created from pro-life and pro-choice rhetoric. This Part explores how these
scripts construct women as decision makers and influence women’s abor-
tion decision making, how they misrepresent regret in ways that imperil
women’s autonomy, and how a relational autonomy model can solve these
problems. Although Part II will explore regret’s contours and associations
with other emotions at greater length, regret is conventionally understood to
be “a negative, cognitively based emotion” that reflects our awareness or
belief that we would be better off at present if we had made a past decision
differently.11 Regret can prompt us to realize that we not only make mis-
takes but should learn from them, including by righting interpersonal
wrongs or changing future behavior.
Social scripts refer to how we know what conduct is expected in par-
ticular social interactions and roles, from how we behave at a business din-
11. Marcel Zeelenberg, Anticipated Regret, Expected Feedback and Behavioral Decision-
Making, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 93, 94 (1999).
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ner to what it means to be a best friend.12 These scripts function as
stereotypes or caricatures, shortcuts to understanding and evaluation.13 We
learn patterned heuristics14 by watching others’ interactions and monitoring
our own.15 These narratives “tell” us (consciously or unconsciously) what we
need to do, and when and where.16 Like other behaviors, our “emotions are
socially constructed, displayed, and managed in the context of the various
social roles, memberships, identities, or categories that individuals oc-
cupy.”17 These norms vary with our relationships and surroundings, and
several may be in play simultaneously.18
While scripts reinforce norms and resolve conflict, their rigidity can
create problems. For any particular social issue, there are “multiple, overlap-
ping, and potentially conflicting emotional ideologies,”19 and we must
choose which to adhere to, and how to negotiate tensions between them. In
addition, if our emotions are at odds with a particular script, we may experi-
ence what Jaggar refers to as “outlaw emotions” or what Thoits terms “emo-
tional deviance”—an “emotion that differs from what is expected,
12. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (1984);
ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDER-
STANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURE (1977).
13. In schematic processing, we create stereotypes to help us organize information. Social
scripts are akin to psychological schemas, such as group or event schemas, which are
used as cognitive shortcuts and change according to individual experience. See H.
ANDREW MICHENER ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 109–11, 114 (5th ed. 2004). As
McCormick observes: “Scripts can be likened to cartoon strips with two or more
captioned scenes. . . . Like such cartoons, a script provides stereotyped information
about how a cast of characters or actors may be expected to behave and the likely
sequence of events.” Naomi B. McCormick, Sexual Scripts: Social and Therapeutic
Implications, 25 SEXUAL & RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 96, 98 (2010). See generally
JEAN MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA
THEORY (1984).
14. “Heuristic” (noun), is defined as the “study or practice of heuristic procedure.”
“Heuristic” (adj.), is defined as “an aid to learning, discovery, or problem-solving by
experimental and especially trial-and-error methods.” Heuristic Definition, MER-
RIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/heuristic (last visited
Apr. 14, 2014).
15. Jennifer J. Halpern, Elements of a Script for Friendship in Transactions, 41 J. CON-
FLICT RESOL. 835, 839 (1997); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 12; SCHANK &
ABELSON, supra note 12.
16. Halpern, supra note 15; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 12; SCHANK & ABEL-
SON, supra note 12.
17. Edward J. Lawler & Shane R. Thye, Bringing Emotions into Social Exchange Theory,
25 ANN. REV. SOC. 217, 224 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Peggy A. Thoits, Emotion Norms, Emotion Work, and Social Order, in FEELINGS AND
EMOTIONS: THE AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM 359, 365 (Antony S. R. Manstead et al.
eds., 2004).
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conventional or obligatory to feel and display.”20 For that reason, even well-
socialized and “emotionally competent” persons must continuously work at
ensuring their emotional reactions fit within social expectations through
“emotion management.”21
The decision of whether or not to obtain an abortion is culturally
portrayed as highly controversial and divisive.22 The bulk of social science
research addressing women’s psychological responses to abortion has con-
cluded that legal first-trimester abortions pose no psychological hazard for
most women, although some experience regret, sadness, or guilt.23 Instead,
women frequently report feeling relief and happiness, and these positive
emotions are experienced more intensely than negative emotions such as
20. Peggy A. Thoits, Emotional Deviance: Research Agendas, in RESEARCH AGENDAS IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 180, 181 (Theodore D. Kemper ed., 1990); see also
Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in WOMEN,
KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 166,
180–84 (Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 2d ed. 1996) (discussing research on
“outlaw emotions,” where individuals may escape established patterns of emotional
control when placed in problematic social situations in which they discover it is
impossible to feel the conventional emotions they know they are “supposed” to
experience).
21. Jennifer Keys, Running the Gauntlet: Women’s Use of Emotion Management Techniques
in the Abortion Experience, 33 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 44 (2010) (citing Gretchen
Peterson, Cultural Theory and Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EMOTIONS 114 (J.E. Stets & J.H. Turner eds., 2006)). For a general discussion of
emotion management, see ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART:
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983).
22. Cahn and Carbone describe the abortion controversy as “a polarizing debate where
neither side accepts the legitimacy of the other’s position,” and assert that it “remains
the family values issue least amenable to compromise.” NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CAR-
BONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION
OF CULTURE 95, 105 (2010). The abortion decision can be a tragic choice of the
sort envisioned by Calabresi and Bobbitt in their classic volume of the same name.
See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 207 n.7 (1978) (dis-
cussing how access to abortion might cause some to support “abortion on demand”:
“If inequalities of access based on differences in wealth and articulateness are per-
ceived as serious enough, some, even many, become willing to endorse an absolute
rule which eliminates those costs, even though it means that . . . they must live with
results which they regard as objectionable. . . .”).
23. Katrina Kimport et al., Social Sources of Women’s Emotional Difficulty After Abortion:
Lessons From Women’s Abortion Narratives, 43 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 103 (2011); Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Responses After Abortion,
248 SCIENCE 41 (1990); Brenda Major & Catherine Cozzarelli, Psychosocial
Predictors of Adjustment to Abortion, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 121 (1992); Brenda Major et
al., Psychological Responses of Women After First-Trimester Abortion, 57 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 777 (2000) [hereinafter Major et al., Psychological Responses];
Brenda Major et al., Attributions, Expectations, & Coping With Abortion, 48 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 585 (1985) [hereinafter Major et al., Attributions].
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loss and other “internal concerns” or social disapproval and associated “ex-
ternal concerns.”24
Abortion, too, is scripted by feeling rules;25 its position in our
worldviews is constructed through early exposure to certain religious, politi-
cal, and familial stimuli as well as diverse influences encountered in matur-
ity.26 Pro-life and pro-choice scripts are certainly among these socializing
forces. Though these scripts are radically different from one another, both
are culturally embedded and respond to repronormative27 gender roles.
According to the pro-life script, sex—a “sacred” act—should be re-
stricted to marriage and family building; children are a “gift from God” to
be joyously welcomed; women should adhere to traditional roles; and abor-
tion is a sin that “destroys a human life and scars the mother with feelings of
intense remorse and prolonged grief.”28 Thus, pro-life literature warns
women of the “inevitable onset of grief and despair.”29 The pro-choice
script, on the other hand, asserts that sex—a pleasurable act—is separate
24. Women who experience regret and distress are most often younger, obtain abortions
at later gestations, have a prior psychiatric history, oppose abortion, or were con-
flicted about the decision. Adler et al., supra note 23, at 41, 42 (reporting that two
weeks after having first-trimester abortions, 76 percent of women felt relief, while
only 17 percent reported feeling guilt); see also Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological
Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1194 (1992) [hereinafter, Ad-
ler et al., Psychological Factors]; Catherine Cozzarelli et al., Mental Models of Attach-
ment and Coping with Abortion, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453 (1998);
Major et al., Psychological Responses, supra note 23, at 777; Brenda Major & Richard
H. Gramzow, Abortion as Stigma Cognitive and Emotional Implications of Conceal-
ment, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735 (1999); Brenda Major et al., Per-
ceived Social Support, Self-Efficacy, and Adjustment to Abortion, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 452 (1990) [hereinafter Major et al., Perceived Social Support].
25. Feeling rules are “standards used in emotional conversation to determine what is
rightly owed and owing in the currency of feeling. Through them, we tell what is
‘due’ in each relation, each role.” HOCHSCHILD, supra note 21, at 18.
26. See generally Keys, supra note 21.
27. Repronormativity is a set of normative assumptions about reproduction and repro-
ductive actors: that women and men will be attracted to one another and form
“conjugal relationships” to birth and raise children. Sue Kentlyn, Reproduction, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MOTHERHOOD 1061, 1062 (Andrea O’Reilly ed., 2010). See
generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and De-
sire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183–97 (2001) (discussing the repronormativity of
motherhood).
28. Keys, supra note 21, at 44 (summarizing KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984)). This description identifies the pro-life move-
ment with a religious worldview, a point that is supported by other social science
research. See, e.g., MUNSON, supra note 7, at 7 (“[T]he pro-life worldview often,
although not universally, includes a strong commitment to religious faith. The com-
mon stereotype of the pro-life movement has it deeply enmeshed in religion—an
outgrowth of conservative religious faith and commitment.”).
29. Keys, supra note 21, at 41.
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from procreation, positions motherhood as a choice that should be well-
timed and abortion as a woman’s right, and characterizes clinical distress as
an atypical response.30 Yet, pro-choice tenets might not effectively counter
pro-life principles. As Tracy Weitz asserts, “simply claiming that ‘most
women feel relief’ ignores the complex emotional experiences of women
seeking abortion and does not advance our overall goal of promoting
women’s health and well-being.”31 Though these scripts merely reflect
“anchor points” on a more complicated ideological spectrum,32 as carica-
tures they often obscure the complexity of activist discourse. Politicizing
abortion and its associated emotions encourages “the minimization or exag-
geration” of women’s experience of painful emotions and distress.33
Social science research has documented how profoundly these narrow
pro-life and pro-choice scripts influence women’s lived experience. Narra-
tives, including others’ life stories, can be powerful instruments of change.34
Yet few social science researchers have interviewed women about their abor-
tion experiences, instead using other, quantitative measures such as “clinical
trials, psychometric scales and statistical analysis of population level
databases.”35 In one of the most recent and thorough qualitative studies,
Jennifer Keys interviewed women choosing abortion to assess how prior so-
cialization to feeling rules affected their emotional experiences and decision
making. She concluded that these contradictory abortion discourses pro-
foundly and directly influence women’s “ideas about what outcomes are
normative and inevitable,” affecting their perceptions of “situational cues, as
well as their emotional goals, strategies, and outcomes.”36 Women are not
only influenced by the feeling rules of their chosen script, but rather, they
internalize both ideologies and are socialized into various other cultural
norms regarding sex and motherhood to differing degrees.37 For example, in
one study, women who had considered or obtained abortions described cer-
tain social scripts that influenced their emotional experiences after abortion;
women associated abortion with painful feelings and expected the abortion
30. Id. at 41, 44–45.
31. Weitz et al., supra note 8, at 87.
32. Keys, supra note 21, at 45.
33. Kimport et al., supra note 23, at 103.
34. For instance, Maxwell describes how the “life histories” of women who had abortions
and shared their experiences with pro-life activists influenced pro-life rhetoric.
CAROL J. C. MAXWELL, PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA: MEANING, MOTIVA-
TION, AND DIRECT ACTION 144 (2002).
35. Weitz et al., supra note 8, at 88.
36. Keys, supra note 21, at 42, 47, 50.
37. Id. at 45.
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to be a “difficult and horrible thing” even when they did not personally
experience distress.38
Women’s sexual responsibility is a prominent theme among pro-life
and pro-choice abortion scripts, including both negative, “irresponsible”
conduct (such as failing to provide contraception and having sex without
anticipating potential consequences) and positive, “responsible” behavior
(such as autonomous abortion decision making and opportunities for per-
sonal growth). In one study by Kimport, Foster, and Weitz, women felt
“they [bore] all responsibility for conceiving, rearing, and supporting the
child and responsibility for providing birth control; it was rare to cite a male
partner’s failure to provide contraception, and this failure seemed not to
trigger blame.”39 These judgments illustrate that conduct leading up to and
following from abortion can generate emotions typically associated with the
procedure itself.40
Research concludes that “either/or” scripts exert pervasive influence on
women’s abortion decision making in conjunction with abortion jurispru-
dence and government regulation.41 The degree to which feeling rules influ-
ence individual women varies according to their abortion views. For some,
adherence to a particular abortion script often “narrows” the feelings they
deem permissible. Pro-life women can feel guilty when they do not feel
shame over extramarital sex or do not experience maternal joy; pro-choice
women can feel troubled if they experience emotions other than relief.42
Both may be afraid that “deviant” emotions will credit opposing views,43
suggesting that scripts’ influence may even prompt some women to give
“adapted” answers about their experiences and reactions.44
In qualitative social science research, women employed emotion-man-
agement strategies, including scripts, to minimize exposure to stressful situa-
tions. They sought to limit their exposure to abortion cues, reaffirm their
reasons for terminating a pregnancy, or debunk anti-abortion arguments.45
Some women used alternative language to avoid or elicit abortion-related
feelings, such as avoiding the phrase “killing it” or choosing self-punishing
38. A. Kero et al., Wellbeing and Mental Growth: Long-Term Effects of Legal Abortion, 58
SOC. SCI. & MED. 2559, 2563 (2004).
39. Kimport et al., supra note 23, at 105.
40. Keys, supra note 21, at 48, 63.
41. As Terry Maroney observes, “[b]eliefs about the prevalence or nature of emotional
experiences, such as post-abortion regret, may affect the valuation of state interests
and may be invoked to expand or limit individual rights.” Terry Maroney, Emotional
Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009).
42. Keys, supra note 21, at 48, 64.
43. Id. at 48, 63–64.
44. Kero et al., supra note 38, at 2567–68.
45. Keys, supra note 21, at 50.
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language such as “murder.”46 Some women resisted personifying the fetus to
decrease abortion’s emotional impact, while others tried to induce guilt and
shame by thinking about fetal development and viewing ultrasounds.47 At
times these strategies broke down; one pro-choice participant indirectly
apologized for affirming a tenet of the pro-life script when she said that the
ultrasound image “gives it a face” and “I feel like a bitch saying it, but it
changes things.”48
Several women adopted a pragmatic “survival” mindset, attempting to
put aside their feelings to get through the experience.49 This mindset could
include tuning out abortion rhetoric, adopting an unemotional outlook or
becoming “numb,” and ceasing to ponder alternatives to abortion—prob-
lematic strategies for pro-life women and those conflicted about the abor-
tion decision.50 Finally, some women engaged in surface-acting (behaving
falsely) at the abortion appointment, afraid that providers could interpret
emotional displays as uncertainty, jeopardizing the abortion.51
Women who acknowledge complex emotional reactions are hard to
find in current pro-life and pro-choice scripts and are hard to fit within
these boundaries. We have a stunted symbolic vocabulary for circumstances
that do not conform to these scripts and urgently need an expanded vernac-
ular for expressing and acknowledging the “ineradicable uncertainty” that is
central to abortion and reproductive decision making.52 Reproductive rights
and medical technology discourses might proffer a metanarrative of women
marching forward, but these linear narratives of progress do not apply to
individual patients who feel at odds with their own lived experience.53
A woman’s post-abortion relief does not mean other painful feelings
have no place in her emotional landscape. Emotional responses to abortion
are complex, and it is natural to be simultaneously satisfied with a particular
decision and experience both painful and positive feelings.54 In fact, it
would be illogical for some women to not experience painful feelings be-
cause of the tendency for values and interests to clash in the abortion con-
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id. at 58.
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 55.
50. Id. at 55–56.
51. Id. at 63.
52. Linda Layne, “How’s the Baby Doing?”: Struggling with Narratives of Progress in a
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, 10 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 624, 641 (1996).
53. In a related context, Layne notes that linear narratives of progress are ill-suited for
the parents of infants in neonatal intensive care units who do not get better. Id.
54. Kero et al., supra note 38, at 2567.
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text.55 While most women do not experience abortion as traumatic, that
does not mean that we should trivialize it and its consequences. We should
work towards creating more open and flexible emotional scripts and feeling
rules where women can be honest about all their emotional reactions,
whether from or related to the procedure.56 A relational autonomy model can
help us further understand how and why current pro-life and pro-choice
scripts proffer inadequate constructions of regret and can assist us in evolv-
ing new narratives of abortion decision making that accommodate more of
women’s diverse and complex emotional reactions and lived experiences.
B. Understanding Regret’s Relational Roots
Autonomy, narrative, social scripts, and relationality are all important
components of a relational autonomy model. This model recognizes that
individuals are not lone rational agents in decision making, but actors em-
bedded in social relations that mediate human existence, even bodily experi-
ence. Autonomy is a key decision-making value that is not exercised in
isolation but is enabled by and through social interaction, including rela-
tionships.57 Through narrative, relationships construct, structure, and bear
55. A. Kero & A. Lalos, Ambivalence—A Logical Response to Legal Abortion: A Prospective
Study Among Women and Men, 21 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
81, 81 (2000).
56. Kero et al., supra note 38, at 2567–68.
57. As a “moral, political, and social ideal,” autonomy is a very broad term; the two
constant features are that “autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable
quality to have.” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY
6, 10 (Sydney Shoemaker et al. eds., 1988). Generally speaking, the ideal of personal
autonomy refers to “self-direction and self-ownership” or “self-rule that is free from
both controlling interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate un-
derstanding, that prevent meaningful choice.” TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58 (5th ed. 2001); DWORKIN,
supra, at 6, 13. As such, it requires freedom and agency. Id.; see also MARINA
OSHANA, PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN SOCIETY, at vii (2006). Many definitions posit
that an autonomous individual acts both “competently” and from values or condi-
tions that are authentic or perceived as “one’s own.” Thus, there are two types of
conditions that are often included with definitions of autonomy: competency condi-
tions and authenticity conditions. See ANDREW SNEDDON, AUTONOMY 26 (2013).
Competency conditions are framed as including capacities as varied as rational
thought, self-control, consideration of values, and ethical evaluation. See SHEILA A.
M. MCLEAN, AUTONOMY, CONSENT AND THE LAW 18–19 (2010), for a descrip-
tion of the various conceptions of competency. Beauchamp and Childress rely on a
definition of autonomy in which someone acts intentionally, with understanding,
and without controlling interferences that determine their action. BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra, at 59. Authenticity is often conflated with personal integration—
the development of a consistent compass of valuation. Diana Tietjens Meyers, Inter-
sectional Identity and the Authentic Self, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PER-
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upon autonomy. Social script theory clarifies how highly predictable narra-
tives of events and roles create, communicate, and perpetuate patterned in-
teractions that evolve into social norms. Relationality describes the
conditions and practices under which people come to “own” a decision—
whether or not they feel autonomous. Relationships can create conditions
that support or stifle autonomy. Individuals’ autonomy is undermined
when “choices” are forced upon them, when decisions are made by the clock
or by default, when decisions are made arbitrarily without reflection and
deliberation, and often when the individual feels alone and/or unsupported.
Conversely, individuals’ autonomy is enhanced when a decision is well-sup-
ported, well-considered, actively made through human reflection, chosen
after acknowledging and assessing personal values and needs as well as those
of others, and made after maturation of perspectives and insights.
Yet our awareness of autonomy’s social grounding “coexists with a still
powerful individualism within academic political theory and philosophy,”58
and relationality is not a frequently used tool in our kit of “common sense”
lay and professional theories.59 Current legal conceptions of autonomy are
rooted in the liberal autonomy model and its emphasis on the decision
maker as a rational, self-controlled, and separate individual.60 Here, auton-
omy is essential to one’s physical and mental integrity and full moral per-
sonhood; as autonomous individuals, we are doers and choosers; as
nonautonomous individuals we become the insane, the infantile, and the
socially dispossessed and disenfranchised. According to the liberal ideal, an
autonomous adult makes choices according to a unified and coherent sys-
tem of values and desires.61 Though socialized by interpersonal and institu-
tional relationships to act “rationally,” she is presumed to exercise her
capacities for action and choice without reference to social relationships, for
therein lies coercion.62 According to liberal autonomy, our integrity pur-
portedly derives from the coherence—the temporal stability—of our will.63
We celebrate the self-determination and self-creation that ground our “deep
SPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 168, 172 (Catriona
Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). The idea of “authenticity” as a predictable
and coherent self is highly contested. See id. at 173–74.
58. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTON-
OMY, AND LAW 9 (2011).
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id. at 115, 174, 277; see also SUSAN WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 64 (Richard Delgado et al. eds.,
2004); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988)(dis-
cussing the separation thesis).
61. WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 41–44.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 64.
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attachment to freedom.”64 To be free means to be separate from the other
and therefore autonomous.65
The law presumes an autonomous individual, sound of mind, is capa-
ble of making decisions on her own behalf so long as those choices do not
harm others.66 Choices arising from internal, personal, and private desires
(or, in a Kantian approach, according to reason) are presumed autonomous
barring evidence of incapacity. Choices arising from external, public, or
even social forces are likely regarded as compelled or coerced and therefore
not autonomous.67 Law ostensibly protects citizens’ autonomy by erecting
walls of rights around them, rendering the most perfectly autonomous indi-
viduals the most perfectly isolated.68
In stark contrast to the solitary man of liberal autonomy, the socially
constructed and relational self uses language to coordinate her life with
others, explain her own subjectivities and encounter others’, and orient her-
self within everyday routines.69 Although mainstream Western theory lo-
cates emotions deep within an individual’s psyche, relational theory houses
them in relationships.70 From this vantage point, rationality is a communi-
cative and collaborative concept,71 and our perceptions and reflections are
socially mediated, “shaped by, and responsive to, social recognition.”72
Autonomy is particularly crucial to relational decision making. It is a
form of subjectivity, and our decision-making abilities are influenced by our
emotions and interpersonal relations. We learn self-esteem and self-trust in
relationships; others’ recognition sustains our self-esteem and confidence,
and our integrity depends on relational behaviors such as reliability and
taking responsibility.73 A relational autonomy model considers how auton-
omy is possible through, not despite, social interaction, explicating how rela-
tions shape the exercise and experience of autonomy and what relational
qualities enhance or undermine it.74 No one is fully autonomous at all times
64. NEDELSKY, supra note 58, at 121.
65. West, supra note 60, at 5.
66. See MCLEAN, supra note 57, at 17–20.
67. WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 41–42.
68. NEDELSKY, supra note 58, at 97–99.
69. PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 21 (1966).
70. See KENNETH J. GERGEN, REALITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS: SOUNDINGS IN SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION 211, 214, 219 (1994).
71. See id. at 218–19, 222, 223, 264–65.
72. Catriona Mackenzie, Imagining Oneself Otherwise, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY:
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF, supra
note 57, at 143.
73. WILLIAMS, supra note 60.
74. See NEDELSKY, supra note 58, at 279.
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and for all purposes; “autonomy exists on a continuum,” and we may be
more autonomous during certain times or situations than others.75
Humans form identities through their social, institutional, and ideo-
logical relationships, including “intimate relationships with parents and lov-
ers, more distant relationships with teachers and employers, and social
structural relationships, such as gender, economic relations, and forms of
governmental power.”76 Dependence and interdependence are fundamental
parts of the human condition. A relational autonomy model is not
grounded in control over one’s self and life trajectory. Instead, it asserts that
control is illusory and does not encourage respectful interpersonal relations
(though being “out of control” can indicate diminished autonomy and hav-
ing others in control can remove autonomy altogether).77 Instead of control,
our autonomy is grounded in our “capacity for creative interaction” that
encompasses “consciously formulating intentions and hopes and trying to
shape one’s life. . . .”78
Law structures relationships; it determines which interpersonal con-
nections have privileged legal standing, favors certain relationships over
others, and promotes or undermines certain core values such as autonomy.79
The relationships that “count” for relational autonomy are not those legiti-
mized by the state, but those an individual finds supportive of autonomous
decision making. In relational autonomy, the seminal question is not which
relationships count (that should be decided by individuals) but how we can
encourage, foster, and, if necessary, legitimize relations that facilitate rather
than undermine participants’ autonomy. The roles of the law in these
processes are often opaque without a relational framework.80
Narrative and social script theories articulate how cultural norms,
practices, and routines construct certain relationships in ways that facilitate
or undermine autonomy. Narratives sequence expressions and events in ac-
cordance with communal norms to create meaning across time.81 Narrative
layers are temporal as well as situational; some layers extend deep within a
given expressive moment, while others stretch between expressive moments.
Relations and narrative are co-constructive because telling stories about our
75. Id. at 46, 288.
76. Id. at 4. Despite widespread recognition of the intense dependency and intercon-
nectedness in childhood, Nedelsky observes, cultural willingness to acknowledge re-
lational dependence “somehow seems to disappear for people over the age of twenty-
one. It is as though once people are ‘formed,’ once they emerge as ‘rational agents,’
relationships are things they simply have or choose.” Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 46, 277.
78. Id. at 170, 292.
79. Id. at 65–66.
80. Id. at 72.
81. GERGEN, supra note 70, at 224.
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identities, relationships, and values allows us to “claim our own characters—
and discern those of other people. . . .”82 Since narrative interpretation and
construction begin with a person’s experiences, values, and prior history,
autonomy is not so much choosing as telling.83 Exercising autonomy often
triggers narration; we self-consciously revise or retell our stories in response
to our need to make choices.84
A relational model explores how relationships and associated emotions
are “supposed to” and actually operate in social interactions and focuses on
how social scripts are created, govern interactions, and are perpetuated or
undermined. Moreover, this model helps to explain our reluctance to con-
sider highly controversial decisions where several incompatible scripts are in
play. Contentious issues are discomfiting precisely because they force us to
confront uncomfortable tensions between morality and immorality, respon-
sibility and irresponsibility—areas of social interdependency. Judith Butler
refers to these circumstances as “precarious”—the condition of “living so-
cially, that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of
the other.”85 This acknowledgment entails both “exposure” to and “depen-
dency” on others, known and unknown.86
So far, this Article has focused on more conventional contrasts be-
tween liberal and relational models of autonomy or between pro-life and
pro-choice scripts. However, one may also employ a different albeit related
framework: examining the relationship between political truth claims87 and
autonomy in socially conservative (right) and socially liberal (left) circles.88
This new framework focuses not on social scripts but on truth claims about
autonomy’s nature and what that value means in the context of a legal right
to abortion. But scripts and truth claims are not mutually exclusive. Social
scripts encompass truth claims, even if in an incomplete, partial, and imper-
fect manner. Discussing abortion in terms of truth claims encourages us to
think outside of the pro-life and pro-choice boxes and deepens our under-
standings of their constructions and contradictions.
82. WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 165–66.
83. Id. at 149.
84. See id. at 149, 155.
85. JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IS LIFE GRIEVABLE? 14 (2009).
86. Id.
87. A truth claim is merely a statement that some condition is true; truth claims can be
verified or falsified. JONATHAN LAVERY & WILLIAM HUGHES, CRITICAL THINKING:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC SKILLS 105 (2008). Truth claims also make
claims about “shared realities” since “[t]o call something true is to imply that it
(generally) can and should be accepted as a belief by the listener.” WILLIAMS, supra
note 60, at 97.
88. I am indebted to June Carbone for her astute insights on this particular issue.
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Pro-life and pro-choice scripts overlap with different understandings
of autonomy’s nature. The idea of autonomy in the abortion debate is slip-
pery because it has two components. One is authenticity, the ability to
choose one’s own values and worldview.89 Whether abortion is permissible,
whether it is murder or ethically acceptable, is a contentious issue, depend-
ing in part on the source of one’s values (e.g., religion or utilitarianism) and
the moral status one ascribes to the beginning of a human life. The second
component is the individual’s ability to make a competent choice.90 The
current legal framework in the United States assumes a woman choosing an
abortion acts autonomously in both senses. Essentially, the notion that a
woman has a constitutional right to choose abortion under some conditions
assumes both that a woman can elect an abortion as an acceptable choice
(otherwise the state would have the right to outlaw it) and that she is capa-
ble of making this choice in particular circumstances.
One of the great ironies underlying the abortion debate is that both
the right and left are skeptical about the human capacity for autonomy,
albeit for different reasons. As Saletan observes, “[w]hereas liberals think of
freedom as a prerequisite to sorting out one’s values, conservatives think of
values as a prerequisite to managing one’s freedom.”91 Social conservatives,
most of whom lean towards pro-life,92 often deny the possibility of auton-
omy in determining whether or not abortion is wrong.93 They are likely to
89. The term “authenticity” is controversial. See, e.g., Phillip Vannini & J. Patrick Wil-
liams, Authenticity in Culture, Self, and Society, in AUTHENTICITY IN CULTURE, SELF,
AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (Phillip Vannini & J. Patrick Williams eds., 2009).
90. See supra note 57.
91. SALETAN, supra note 6.
92. See, e.g., CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22, at 94 (“[V]iews on abortion, at least in
recent years, correspond with political preferences more generally.”); ROBERT SINGH,
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES
52 (2003) (identifying the pro-life movement with the Republican party and discuss-
ing the historical partisan polarization of abortion).
93. See, e.g., Rick Santorum, My Fight for Life, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577176641699224320.html
?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop (“I believe that all life is precious. I know life be-
gins at conception. I know that every person, every child conceived in the womb, has
a right to life. I know that life is a right endowed by our Creator, that it is inaliena-
ble, laid down in the Declaration of Independence, and should be guaranteed under
the Constitution. . . . Without its protection, no other rights matter.”). Santorum
has also intimated that women who obtain abortions are somehow coerced or
manipulated: “I grieve for the children lost and for the mothers who have been
deceived by a society selling selfishness. I am thankful for the faithful workers around
the country who serve at pro-life pregnancy centers providing women honest infor-
mation and additional choices.” Id. This commitment to life might be so strong that
it applies even in extreme cases such as rape. See, e.g., Piers Morgan Tonight: Interview
with Rick Santorum (CNN television broadcast Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://
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see values in terms of right or wrong, divinely ordained, fixed rather than
changing, rule-based rather than contextual.94 The stereotypical pro-life
script constructs the pregnant woman as a mother, the fetus as human life,
and abortion as murder.95 Within this worldview, an individual is autono-
mous so long as she can choose; the choice to “sin,” after all, is an act of will
meriting punishment. Thus, values-based autonomy—the ability to deter-
mine right or wrong—is seen as an oxymoron, but act-specific autonomy—
the ability to choose whether to do a certain action—is always presumed so
long as the individual has free will in any meaningful sense.
Those on the left, including many but not all of those who are pro-
choice, are also skeptical about autonomy.96 Unlike the socially conservative
right, however, they believe that the individual, not the state or the commu-
nity, should determine which values matter. Accordingly, they oppose a
governmental determination that abortion is immoral, either on the basis of
religious views or a communal majority vote.97 Because individuals should
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1201/20/pmt.01.html (“As horrible as the
way that that [sic] son or daughter and son was created, it still is her child. . . . I
believe and I think the right approach is to accept this horribly created—in the sense
of rape—but nevertheless a gift in a very broken way, the gift of human life, and
accept what God has given to you.”).
94. This is substantiated by the research that Ziad Munson has conducted on the mak-
ing of pro-life activists. See MUNSON, supra note 7, at 2 (recognizing the “dualistic
worldview” regarding abortion and demonstrating this proposition’s truth with an
interviewee’s statement that “[a]bortion is not about politics, is not about
choice . . . it’s about truth and what is right and wrong.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
95. See, e.g., CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22, at 93.
96. This skepticism is related to Marxist concerns that “the working class is systemati-
cally and successfully indoctrinated with the values of the ruling class,” and accord-
ingly related to theories of manipulative socialization and false consciousness. See
generally Michael Mann, The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy, 35 AM. SOC. REV.
423, 435, 437 (1970) (finding empirical evidence of indoctrination of dominant
values). Such a relation is evident in the work of scholars such as Catherine MacKin-
non who draw on Marxist theory in critiquing liberalism. See CATHARINE A. MACK-
INNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 122 (1989) (stating that
liberal idealism and Marxist theory “oversimplify . . . social reality”). It is also present
in works such as Thomas Frank’s bestseller, What’s the Matter With Kansas?, that
discuss “the manipulation of consent in American democracy.” Cynthia Willett,
False Consciousness and Moral Objectivity in Kansas, 22 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL. 290,
291–94 (2008) (citing THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?
(2004)) (discussing Frank’s initial observation that since the Reagan era “ordinary
folk, once democrats and populists, now allow moral values to trump their economic
interests and vote Republican” and his interpretation of this as an instance “false
consciousness”).
97. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion
Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 568 (2009) (“Liberals typically take the
position that the morality of abortion . . . is a deeply personal, and often religious,
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determine values and abortion’s moral and ethical acceptability for them-
selves, the state should have no power to impose a particular perspective on
those who do not share it. The conventional pro-choice script positions the
fetus as “potential life, deserving perhaps of enhanced respect, but subject to
the same balancing tests of advantages and disadvantages as other more pro-
saic decisions.”98 Yet, the left fears that majoritarian views might unduly
influence individual decisions about abortion’s moral status and about
whether to choose abortion under particular circumstances.
Thus, the left simultaneously places greater significance on the indi-
vidual’s ability to choose her own values and make choices in accordance
with them,99 and is more skeptical about her capacity to do so.100 The right
does not share this skepticism; for them, an individual cannot autono-
mously determine what is morally “right” (that is fixed and immutable), but
she can autonomously choose whether to do what is right. Therefore, the
pro-choice left has a greater stake in monitoring the contexts in which indi-
viduals exercise autonomy than those on the right.
When considering how pro-life and pro-choice scripts map onto lib-
eral and relational models of autonomy, further ironies appear. At first, the
pro-life narrative appears to be more relational because it focuses on the
maternal-fetal connection,101 the existence and value of which it portrays as
matter that each person should decide for herself.”); see also GEORGE LAKOFF,
MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002) (ar-
guing that in the liberal worldview, abortion is a matter of “individual responsibility,
not government action”); Marcy Darnovsky, Moral Questions of an Altogether Differ-
ent Kind: Progressive Politics in the Biotech Age, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 102
(2010) (“From the 1960s until the past few years . . . the dominant left and center
view during these decades was liberal in the classical sense. . . . Moral and ethical
values were seen as private concerns, unwelcome in the public sphere, and certainly
not matters on which government policy should take sides.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITI-
CAL LIBERALISM 98 (1993) (noting that a view is autonomous in part because it is
“not simply presented as [a] moral requirement[ ] externally imposed” nor “required
of us by other citizens whose comprehensive doctrines we do not accept”); Mark
Warren, Liberal Constitutionalism as Ideology: Marx and Habermas, 17 POL. THEORY
511, 517 (1989) (“Liberal constitutionalism evokes not so much an abstract individ-
ualism . . . as it does the intimacy of human relations against the corrupting influ-
ences of power.”); Larry Krasnoff, Autonomy and Plurality, 60 PHIL. Q. 673, 673
(2010); WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 41–42.
98. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22, at 92.
99. See RAWLS, supra note 97.
100. The left is opposed not only to abortion restrictions, but also to “personhood”
amendments that purport to give full juridical rights to embryos, even if these
amendments would not directly impose any positive or negative legal obligations on
anyone, simply because they believe that individuals should determine the morality
of abortion and personhood for themselves. See Borgmann, supra note 97, at
555–56, 568.
101. See supra note 95; see infra note 111.
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immutable. Because the right sees this relationship as incontrovertible, like
abortion’s immorality, its importance has nothing to do with a woman’s
autonomy (which is largely presumed). In other words, it is not an autono-
mous act for a woman to decide that, in her worldview, the fetal connection
is sacrosanct and abortion is immoral. The fundamental question for the
right is not how a woman comes to situate abortion and her relationship to
the fetus in her worldview, but whether or not she decides to get the abor-
tion. In reality, therefore, the right gravitates much more towards the liberal
autonomy model.
At the same time, the left appears to be less relational and closer to the
liberal autonomy model because it explicitly focuses on “choice.” Because it
recognizes how social relations can impact individual choices, however, it is
actually much closer to relational autonomy. According to the left, whether
abortion is right or wrong is up to the individual, and it is essential that she
(not the state or social order) make this determination.102 Because the left is
skeptical of whether she can make this determination free from influence or
coercion, it questions the possibility of a “true” or “authentic” expression of
autonomy, but realistically regards an imperfect determination as superior
to one made by the state. The fundamental question for the left is not
whether or not a woman chooses abortion, but how she comes to situate
abortion within her worldview. Ironically, then, the pro-life right is re-
garded as closer to relational autonomy and the pro-choice left as closer to
liberal autonomy, when in fact the opposite is true.
C. Scripting Regret
A relational conception of autonomy exposes latent controversies and
reveals perspectives that the liberal individualistic model obscures. Examin-
ing lived experience, not theoretical discussion, best demonstrates relational-
ity’s usefulness; the allegation that we “mak[e] a decision about an
individual neutrally or without any consideration of other people in the
family is neither ethically coherent nor empirically supportable.”103
Currently, mainstream abortion social scripts create an invidious di-
chotomy, offering us a choice between a pro-life script portraying women as
victims and a pro-choice script casting them as autonomous agents. Each
script has different implications for autonomy—either condemning or
championing women’s decision-making capacity. These choices are inaccu-
rate and insufficient; we need a script not where women are either one thing
102. See supra note 97.
103. See Kimberly Strong, Ian Kerridge & Miles Little, Savior Siblings, Parenting and the
Moral Valorization of Children, BIOETHICS 5 (2012), available at http://online-
library.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.02001.x/pdf.
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or another, but one in which women can be “both/and,” or something else
entirely.
Acknowledging that women’s choices are subject to constraints is not
the same as conceding that they are not autonomous. The goal of applying a
relational model is not to place women in one category or the other but to
assess what changes will ensure women are more autonomous and less vic-
timized. As decision makers, we are never fully autonomous; all decisions
are situated within a complex, changing, and persistent network of con-
straints. In the abortion context, many of these difficulties are peripheral to
reproductive decision making such as devalued caretaking roles, insufficient
maternity leave, and a chronic shortage of high-quality but affordable child-
care. Relational autonomy is but the first baby step towards changing some
of these factors.
Critically, pro-choice organizations are aware of these rhetorical weak-
nesses. According to Ludlow, an academic and an experienced abortion care
worker, there is “a hierarchy of abortion narratives from a political pro-
choice perspective”: (1) “politically necessary” narratives (rape, incest and
domestic violence; confrontations with antiabortion protesters; and the risks
of illegal abortion); (2) “politically acceptable” narratives (contraceptive fail-
ure, fetal anomalies, financial constraints); and (3) “the things we cannot
say” (multiple abortions, no contraceptive use, post-abortion grief, and eco-
nomics of abortion care).104 Most clinic experiences are in the third cate-
gory.105 Thus, our inability or unwillingness to acknowledge regret
contributes to the “silence and stigma around abortion, even among pro-
choice people.”106 Through its recent “Not in Her Shoes” campaign,107
Planned Parenthood attempts to switch the movement’s focus from pro-life
and pro-choice labels that “limit the conversation”108 to how abortion “is a
deeply personal and often complex decision for a woman to make.”109 The
campaign highlights relationality, calling for “empathy” and asserting “deci-
104. Jeannie Ludlow, The Things We Cannot Say: Witnessing the Traumatization of Abor-
tion in the United States, 36 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 28, 29–30 (2008).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See Not in Her Shoes, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.ppaction.org/site/Page
Server?pagename=pp_ppol_notinhershoes#.UyEG0PlSaQA (last visited Apr. 14,
2014).
108. See Anya Callahan, Planned Parenthood Ditches “Pro-Choice” Label for Nuance, GEN-
ERATION PROGRESS (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:06 AM), http://campusprogress.org/articles/
planned_parenthood_ditches_pro-choice_label_for_nuance/; see also Katie Yoder,
Planned Parenthood Campaign Eliminates “Pro-Life,” “Pro-Choice” Language, NEW-
SBUSTERS (Jan. 18, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/katie-yoder/2013/
01/18/planned-parenthood-campaign-eliminates-pro-life-pro-choice-language.
109. Not in Her Shoes, supra note 107.
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sions about whether to choose adoption, end a pregnancy, or raise a child
must be left to a woman, her family, and her faith, with the counsel of her
doctor or health care provider.”110
Both pro-life and pro-choice scripts explicitly or implicitly revolve, to
a large degree, around the maternal-fetal relationship and consequently
upon the fetus’s construction within social, cultural, political, and even
medical milieus. In pro-life scripts, this relationship is front and center; the
pregnant woman is a mother who is intimately connected to her fetus.111
Pro-choice scripts highlight a woman’s relationship with her current and
future selves.112 Of course, these relations are only two of many connections
women may appraise as less, equally, or more significant.113 As Linda Layne
observes through her scholarship on miscarriage, the “distinction between a
fetus and a baby is defined not by gestational development but through
social relationships—the pregnant woman’s with her fetus, her family, and
her community.”114
The maternal-fetal relationship is cumbersome because of debate over
the fetus’s moral status. Confronting the distinction between abortion and
110. Id. In response, NARAL Pro-Choice America reiterated its commitment to “pro-
choice.” See NARAL Pro-Choice Am., On the Language of Choice, BLOG FOR
CHOICE (Jan. 17, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.blogforchoice.com/archives/2013/
01/on-the-language.html.
111. Glen A. Halva-Neubauer & Sara L. Zeigler, Promoting Fetal Personhood: The Rhetori-
cal and Legislative Strategies of the Pro-Life Movement After Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 22 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 101, 108 (2010).
112. Women’s narratives about their abortions often resound with consciousness about
actual past and future selves as well as curiosity about potential past and future selves.
See, e.g., Alana Bibeau, The Political is Personal, or God Bless America, in ABORTION
UNDER ATTACK 107–08 (Krista Jacob ed., 2006) (“What would it be like if I had
carried the child to term? . . . I would have had to compromise my education, my
career, or my parenting in order to work at providing a good life for myself and my
child.”).
113. Significantly, a relational autonomy model does not assess a fetus’s status in abstract
and absolutist terms of personhood—whether a fetus is “a person” or not “a per-
son”—but in relative terms of relationality. SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT:
FEMINIST ETHICS & HEALTH CARE 109 (1992). From this vantage point, unborn
fetuses are obviously restricted in their ability to form and participate in a variety of
social roles and relationships; every relationship in which they are involved is indirect
and necessarily involves the pregnant woman. Thus, feminist relational autonomy
posits a fetus has no absolute value; rather, the pregnant woman herself must deter-
mine what “social status and value” her fetus has and associated values will vary
dramatically from woman to woman and may change for any particular woman
throughout her pregnancy. Id. at 110–11.
114. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 42 (citing Linda Layne, “I Remember the Day I Shopped for
Your Layette”: Consumer Goods, Fetuses, and Fetishism in the Context of Pregnancy Loss,
in FETAL SUBJECTS, FEMINIST POSITIONS (Lynn M. Morgan & Meredith W.
Michaels eds., 1999) [hereinafter Layne, I Remember the Day]).
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other medical procedures, physician Lisa Harris asserts that, though the fe-
tus’s moral status is “reasonably the subject of much disagreement. . . . It is
disingenuous to argue that removing a fetus from a uterus is no different
from removing a fibroid.”115 At times, this apparent reluctance to discuss
the maternal-fetal relationship has led pro-choice advocates down rocky
paths. After the Partial Birth Abortion Act’s passage, for example, advocates
first claimed the technique was “used rarely and largely in cases of fetal
anomaly or death” instead of explaining why the procedure was safer than
others, resulting in a “loss of credibility” and a loss of opportunity for public
education.116 As a provider, Harris finds it problematic to situate a second-
trimester abortion within pro-choice rhetoric employing “a practice of ab-
straction that tends to obliterate or to erase the realities of bloodiness and
violence attached to abortion.”117 This problem, however, may be largely
rhetorical; clinic practices appear to be more flexible in accommodating
women’s needs. Clinic staff follow women’s lead in calling fetuses “babies,”
allow women to hold fetal remains after a late-term procedure, and let
women view fetuses and fetal tissue following procedures completed at ear-
lier gestations.118 Few staff members and providers speak publicly about
these practices, however, and so silence contributes to the problem and dis-
cussion framework.
Furthermore, both pro-life and pro-choice scripts have traditionally
focused attention on rights-based discourse119 instead of conceptualizing the
abortion decision as an embodied and relational event.120 This focus does
little to counter abortion stigmatization.121 Moreover, exercising a “right” to
abortion is incidental to women’s reasons for terminating their pregnancies;
“most women do not decide to have abortions because they are, at that
moment, exercising their rights. They have abortions because their lives are
complicated.”122 Perhaps it is surprising that pro-choice abortion scripts are
not more tied to issues of family and social welfare. This might be a conse-
quence of reactive politics,123 and some might interpret such concerns as
115. Lisa H. Harris, Second Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Chang-
ing the Discourse, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 74, 75 (2008).
116. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 38–39.
117. Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on “Reproduction” and
the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355, 371 (1989).
118. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 40, 43, 45–46.
119. See SALETAN, supra note 6, at 4–7.
120. See id.
121. Jeannie Ludlow, Love and Goodness: Toward a New Abortion Politics, 38 FEMINIST
STUD. 474, 475 (2012).
122. Id. at 476.
123. Amy Borovoy, Beyond Choice: A New Framework for Abortion?, DISSENT, Fall 2011,
at 73, 77.
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“ced[ing] this issue to the Right.”124 Some pro-choice efforts to acknowl-
edge the embodied qualities of the abortion decision have been met with
sharp criticism from inside the movement,125 and pro-choice scholars often
acknowledge that such remarks are “risky” even as they make them.126
Regret is a “persistent feature” in both pro-life and pro-choice scripts,
situated as an emotion that is either actively present, palpable, and problem-
atic (in the pro-life “victim” script) or invisible (in the pro-choice “autono-
mous agent” script).127 These constructions are problematic for several
reasons; for example, not all “victims” will experience regret, and some au-
tonomous women will. We need to take a closer look at regret to under-
stand why this is so.
Notwithstanding social science and medical research, pro-life activists
persistently claim women do experience regret and strong emotional distress
following the abortion procedure. This idea continues to gain currency,
even supporting the Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez v. Carhart.128 In
contrast, regret is the elephant in the room within the pro-choice camp,
which has not focused on regret on the grounds that it could “weaken their
political position.”129 Thus, what is needed is something neither side nor
script currently offers:
We need to develop a new body of knowledge regarding what
emotional support women want and need along with their abor-
tion care. It should capture the lived and embodied experiences
of women who have abortions alongside the clinical trials, psy-
124. Id. at 78.
125. For instance, Frances Kissling, the founder of Catholics for a Free Choice, published
an article in 2004, calling for pro-choice activists to “acknowledge the moral value of
a fetus—and the potentially painful reality of its loss.” Ludlow, supra note 10, at 29.
She also urged the movement to develop a discourse that combined rights-based
discourse with “exploration of how other values might also be respected, including
the value of developing human life,” thus moving beyond the rather simplistic di-
chotomies that have characterized U.S. abortion discourse.” Id. Kissling was criti-
cized by several leading pro-choice figures including Ellie Smeal (Feminist Majority
Foundation), Susan Hill (National Woman’s Health Organization), and Rosalind
Petchesky. Id. at 30. Joan Malin, CEO of Planned Parenthood of New York, has
voiced concerns similar to Kissling’s. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. at 28, 42 (quoting Linda Layne as stating “feminists have avoided any
discussion of fetuses for fear of adding fuel to the antiabortionists’ fire.”); see also
Harris, supra note 115 (stating that some abortion issues such as “personal and psy-
chological aspects,” “visual and visceral dimensions,” “violence inherent in abortion,”
and providers’ “legitimate ethical and moral issues” with second trimester abortion
that “may frankly be too dangerous for pro-choice movements to acknowledge”).
127. Kate Greasley, Abortion and Regret, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 705, 705 (2012).
128. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
129. Kimport et al., supra note 23, at 103.
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chometric scales and statistical analysis of population level
databases. To do this, we need to partner with the women them-
selves and not be afraid to acknowledge the full range of feelings
women have about abortion.130
Despite the obstacles they face, most women actually make decisions
in a relationally autonomous manner. Research suggests the abortion deci-
sion is relational in at least two ways; the decision outcome affects women’s
relations with others (including already-born children, the fetus, and chil-
dren born in the future), and women often consider others’ viewpoints and
how these viewpoints will be affected by their decisions.
Carol Gilligan’s classic case study of abortion decision making, In a
Different Voice, describes how women’s moral judgment is oriented more
towards empathy and compassion than men’s, and how women construct
moral problems as issues of care and responsibility instead of rights and
rules.131 With abortion, the ideal of maternal (and feminine) self-sacrifice
calls for a woman to earn redemption by giving birth to the child and giving
him up for adoption or by keeping the child and raising him—in other
words, to put the child’s needs before her own.132 Gilligan asserts the abor-
tion decision requires a woman to consider how these outcomes affect her
and others and thus, “engages directly the critical moral issue of hurting.”133
She posits women make this decision in a framework of “selfishness and
responsibility”; inflicting harm is deemed “selfish and immoral” while care
fulfills moral responsibility.134 Women who obtain an abortion “for them-
selves” might be considered selfish and/or immoral for abdicating their
moral roles and commitments and allegedly showing “insufficient concern
for her child-to-be.”135 Therefore, the pro-life and pro-choice scripts do not
effectively capture the quality, complexity, or substance of the abortion de-
cision-making process for most women.
Relational autonomy can help us to bridge the gap between cultural
constructions and lived experience. Relationality describes the conditions
and practices under which people come to experience a decision as their
own, whether or not they feel autonomous. In abortion decision making,
relationships can support or stifle autonomous decision making. An abor-
tion decision is not autonomous if it is forced on a woman or made arbitrar-
ily, without reflection and deliberation. Women who conceal their
130. Weitz et al., supra note 8.
131. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 73 (1982).
132. Appleton, supra note 3, at 323–24.
133. GILLIGAN, supra note 131, at 71.
134. Id. at 105.
135. Appleton, supra note 3, at 324.
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pregnancies and act in secret do not exercise their full autonomous capacity,
since relationally autonomous decision making necessitates communication
and mobilizing communal networks—talking through an issue, considering
others’ opinions, and reflecting upon how outcomes will affect others.136
This process of reflection and deliberation is inherently relational. Without
a relational autonomy perspective, we only partially understand how growth
or maturation occurs within decision making.
Finally, a relational autonomy model can explicate both regret’s strate-
gic functions within mainstream abortion scripts and its roles in lived expe-
rience. Pro-life and pro-choice scripts each use the concept of regret as a
rhetorical tool to communicate the presence, absence, and strength of the
maternal-fetal relation, transforming regret into a proxy for that connection.
These elements are masked by a more traditional model of liberal auton-
omy, where the individual bears the weight of her decision alone.
II. REVISING REGRET: TOWARDS A NEW CONSCIOUSNESS OF ABORTION
IN LIVED EXPERIENCE
Conventionally, regret is understood as “a negative, cognitively based
emotion we experience when realizing or imagining our present situation
would have been better, had we decided differently.”137 It is “pervasive in
daily life,” and is the second most commonly experienced emotion, after
love.138 It has several associated emotions: sorrow, grief, pain, dissatisfaction,
longing, remorse, feeling that “we should have known better,” “sinking feel-
ings,” feeling like “kicking ourselves,” and desires for second chances.139 Re-
gret can be supportive of relational autonomy; without it, our mistakes
136. See supra Part I.B.
137. Zeelenberg, supra note 11. Other definitions are in concurrence. E. Allen Farnsworth
defines regret as “the sensation of distress that you feel on concluding that you have
done something contrary to your present self-interest, something that does not ac-
cord with your present preferences.” Appleton, supra note 3, at 265 (citing E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 20
(1998)). Chris Guthrie notes, “regret is a painful feeling we experience upon deter-
mining that we could have obtained a better outcome if we had decided or behaved
differently.” Guthrie, supra note 3, at 882. Finally, Terry Maroney states:
To say that a person ‘regrets’ something is to express that she has made a
negative self-evaluation based on past voluntary action now judged to be an
avoidable mistake, and that she has coupled that evaluation with a wish for
an imagined reality that would have obtained had the action been different.
Maroney, supra note 41, at 892–93.
138. Colleen Saffrey et al., Praise For Regret: People Value Regret Above Other Negative
Emotions, 32 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 46, 52 (2008).
139. Marcel Zeelenberg, The Use of Crying Over Spilled Milk: A Note on the Rationality
and Functionality of Regret, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 325, 327 (1999); Janet Landman,
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would not be as painful, and we would be less likely to learn from them.140
Motivated by regret, we may try to right wrongs through reparative behav-
iors such as apology, or we may decide to change our future behavior. Peo-
ple perceive regret as useful, with “a wide range of positive benefits” such as
“placing past events in context, encouraging approach and avoidance behav-
iors, gaining insight into one’s own past behavior and current disposition,
and also in facilitating smoother social relations.”141 Intense regret, however,
can lead to pathological distress.142
We can distinguish regret from several associated emotions and behav-
iors, including undoing, disappointment, remorse, and guilt.143 The most
relevant emotion for our purposes is remorse. Though regret is similar to
remorse in that both are “painful and distressing emotions having to do
with an unfortunate life event or transgression,” they are also different in
numerous ways.144 Regret has broader applicability and is wider in scope
than remorse. We can regret another’s acts but we can feel remorse only for
our own behavior.145 In addition, we can feel regret for something morally
innocuous, even virtuous, but we feel remorse for acts we deem morally
wrong.146 We can regret future actions that we must perform, but we feel
remorse only for our past acts; similarly, genuine remorse entails an intent
not to commit the same act in the future, but regret does not necessarily
involve the same restrictions.147
Regret’s exact meaning and implications are supplied by and within a
number of institutions, cultures, and contexts, including pro-life and pro-
choice scripts. Regret might reveal only that a decision was difficult or
somehow problematic.148 This assertion finds support in Susan Frelich-Ap-
pleton’s argument that courts deploy regret for various purposes across di-
verse reproductive contexts.149 Certain conceptions of regret are cultivated
for specific ends; exposed to these constructions, women “may be culturally
conditioned or required to fit their subsequent reflections into a certain
expressive framework, typically packaged in the language of regret.”150
Regret: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 17 J. FOR THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 135,
137 (1987).
140. Zeelenberg, supra note 139, at 335.
141. Saffrey et al., supra note 138, at 46, 51–52.
142. Id.
143. See generally Landman, supra note 139.




148. Greasley, supra note 127, at 709.
149. Appleton, supra note 3, at 261.
150. Greasley, supra note 127, at 706.
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Regret’s malleability makes it versatile. It can be a proxy for psychopa-
thology or emotion, signify a host of emotional difficulties surrounding un-
wanted pregnancy and abortion, and represent conflicts between the desires
of the head and those of the heart.151 Conventional abortion scripts isolate
and emphasize a few circumstances where women can experience regret,
positioning these experiences as highly representative.152 This emphasis ig-
nores and illegitimates other aspects of lived experience, potentially disen-
franchising the women who undergo such experiences. Sometimes women
mourn the loss of a relationship the pregnancy embodied, not the “loss of
the fetus for its own sake.”153 Regret may not even stem from attachment to
pregnancy but can be “bigger than—or even distinct from—the experience
of fetal loss.”154 Understandings of regret derived from ideological slogans
and scripts are inappropriate tools for analysis and enlightenment. Rather,
regret’s content should be derived from women’s lived experiences of abor-
tion, the abortion decision itself, and the relational contexts in which the
abortion decision is made. This conception of regret would provide a richer
portrait of the relational, embedded, and embodied context in which
women negotiate abortion.
Abortion narratives—case law and cultural scripts—commit several
mistakes in constructing regret, all of which are intertwined. Two of these—
mischaracterizing regret’s intensity and conflating remorse with regret—are
erroneous constructions of regret itself. These missteps are more tangential
to relational autonomy but are entangled with four other mistakes: confin-
ing regret to the abortion decision, confining regret to the maternal-fetal
relationship and women’s self commitment, coupling regret with defective
decisions making, and linking regret with moral culpability. The following
sections will discuss each mistake in turn, explaining how each arises in
abortion jurisprudence and/or conventional abortion scripts, how each is
handled by liberal autonomy, and how each is corrected through closer at-
tention to lived experience and a relational autonomy model.
A. Mistake 1: Conflating Regret with Psychopathology
The first common mistake is conflating the regret emotion with path-
ological distress, overinflating regret’s intensity. Pro-life scripts assign a
profound, even debilitating role to regret, claiming that women instinctually
151. Kimport, supra note 9, at 107.
152. See supra Part I.C.
153. Kimport, supra note 9, at 107.
154. Id. at 110.
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and somewhat automatically experience attachment to their pregnancies.155
They suggest that women who “reject” this relationship through abortion
can experience “post-abortion syndrome” (PAS), comprised of psychological
effects such as depression, grief, anxiety, low self-esteem, regret, remorse,
and even suicidal thoughts.156 Pro-choice scripts downgrade regret to an
emotion felt rarely in comparison to relief and point to social science re-
search suggesting abortion does not cause clinical distress.157 This assertion
is often boiled down to the idea that women feel relief in lieu of regret.158
The lack of a consensus on the definition of regret in advocacy rhetoric and
mental health research reflects our uncertainty of and discomfort with the
boundary between emotion and pathology, reveals cultural assumptions
about our ability to cope with relational loss, and demonstrates how the
regret experience is mediated by other individuals and institutions.
Regret as an emotion versus a psychological condition is not so much
a difference in kind but in intensity. If regret is used as proxy for relational-
ity then the quality of the regret—what it is, how intensely it is felt—stands
for the quality of the relationship to which it is constructed to correspond:
the maternal-fetal bond. Regret’s categorization thus yields insights into
how some relations are prioritized over others (e.g., the maternal-fetal rela-
tion outweighs a romantic liaison) and how scripts, not women, fix these
relational hierarchies. These principles constrain the decision-making pro-
cess. Women are aware of what cultural weight is assigned to various rela-
tionships and experience dissonance or even distress if they value them
differently.159
The debate over whether regret is an emotion or psychopathology re-
flects regret’s strategic use in pro-choice and pro-life script feeling rules. In
the 1980s and 1990s, the pro-life movement focused explicitly on the fetus,
often using fetal images to convey the fetus’s humanity, to depict existing
life and relationships, and to document the gravity, inhumanity, and immo-
rality of fetal termination.160 Women’s embodied experience of the mater-
155. Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health: Evaluating the Evidence, 64 AM.
PSYCHOL. 863, 866 (2009).
156. Id.; see also Siegel, supra note 3, at 1658; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008);
David C. Reardon, Abortion Decisions and the Duty to Screen: Clinical, Ethical, and
Legal Implications of Predictive Risk Factors of Post-Abortion Maladjustment, 20 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 33, 65–66 (2003).
157. Kimport, supra note 9 (citing Patricia Wasielewski, Post-Abortion Syndrome: Emo-
tional Battles over Interaction and Ideology, 18 HUMBOLDT J. SOC. RELATIONS 101
(1992)).
158. Id. at 105.
159. See Keys, supra note 21, at 42, 47, 50.
160. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 1660.
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nal-fetal relationship, its termination, and regret were secondary concerns.
When pro-life activists felt the effectiveness of these advocacy efforts dimin-
ishing, they chose a “softer” focus: regret and the abortion’s impact on the
woman.161
The deeper and more pervasive—and pathological—the regret experi-
ence, the more useful it becomes for pro-life narratives positing that women
need help to recognize and respect the maternal-fetal relationship, to make
the abortion decision, or to heal from it. This counters the idea that a close
bond between woman and fetus is natural and automatic.162 Significantly,
the pro-life script portrays women as victims whether or not they experience
regret.163 Regret’s absence intimates a woman did not know about the ma-
ternal-fetal relationship, did not consider it, and/or did not respect it, and
therefore used flawed decision making to make the wrong choice. Regret’s
presence, however, also indicates much the same thing. The only “right”
choice is to continue, not sever, the maternal-fetal relationship. In pro-life
scripts, regret has no role to play without abortion, because one “cannot”
regret giving birth to a living child.164
Conversely, the more regret resembles an emotion—temporary in du-
ration and effect—the more useful it is for pro-choice perspectives. Here,
regret’s absence indicates autonomous decision making, and its presence
suggests non-autonomous decision making. Within the pro-choice script,
the maternal-fetal relationship is not assigned any fixed moral worth,165 and
relationships are constructed as reciprocal ties between two humans. This
characterization, however, ignores many women’s joy in pregnancy—a
largely nonreciprocal relational attachment.166 Pro-choice scripts also pre-
sume that a woman experiencing regret views her abortion as a mistake.167
161. Id. at 1664–69.
162. See, e.g., BARBARA ALMOND, THE MONSTER WITHIN: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF
MOTHERHOOD (2010).
163. At times, women can literally be referred to as victims. See, e.g., CHARLES J. STEW-
ART, CRAIG ALLEN SMITH & ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., PERSUASION AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 263 (6th ed. 2012) (referring to a “former ‘victim’ of abortion” whose
narrative is featured on the Feminists for Life website).
164. See infra Part II.B.
165. See supra note 7.
166. See generally TORI KROPP, THE JOY OF PREGNANCY: THE COMPLETE, CANDID, AND
REASSURING COMPANION FOR PARENTS-TO-BE (2008) (providing women with in-
formation regarding pregnancy while simultaneously reminding pregnant women to
relax and allow themselves to enjoy the experience).
167. For example, the Canadian group Pro Choice Action Network published a brochure
that refutes the “common misconception” that “[w]omen who have abortions regret
their mistake later” with the argument that “[a] few women may come to regret their
abortion, but this should not be a reason to deny choice to all women.” PRO
CHOICE ACTION NETWORK, MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ABORTION (2009), availa-
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As an emotional concept, then, regret “remains fuzzy and loosely under-
stood by both sides as a woman’s wish after the fact that she had never
undergone the abortion procedure.”168
Social science research concludes regret is an emotion distinguishable
from psychopathology. As Major et al. observe, regret and other emotions
are seen as “negative psychological experiences or reactions” to abortion,
distinct from psychopathological conditions such as “major depression, gen-
eralized anxiety disorder, or posttraumatic stress disorder.”169 The American
Psychological Association’s report on mental health and abortion, published
in 2008, also takes this position.170 This distinction between regret and
clinical distress is more than merely useful; rigorous mental health research
must distinguish emotional reactions from pathological conditions. Dadlez
and Andrews note, “[f]eeling regret is not a psychiatric condition,”171 and
there is a “world of difference between a medically recognized ‘syndrome’
and ordinary feelings of regret or ambivalence.”172
One expects conflating regret and clinical distress to be a pro-life strat-
egy, especially for “documenting” PAS. This conflation transforms regret
from an emotion into a behavioral justification173 for choosing motherhood
or adoption over abortion or for casting abortion as an irrational choice that
harms women’s well-being.174 Both characterizations overinflate regret’s
likely intensity and significance, transforming regret from a “mere psycho-
logical or emotional reaction” to a “retrospective judgment about the
wrongness of the abortion decision.”175 It is surprising, then, that both pro-
ble at http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/print-friendly/misconceptions
.pdf.
168. Kimport, supra note 9, at 106.
169. Major et al., supra note 155, at 869.
170. This is not surprising, as Brenda Major chaired the Task Force on Mental Health and
Abortion. See BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION (2008)(“In considering the mental health impli-
cations of abortion, it is crucial to distinguish between clinically significant mental
disorders, such as major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, or posttraumatic
stress disorder, and a normal range of negative emotions or feelings one might expe-
rience following a difficult decision, such as feelings of regret, sadness, or dysphoria.
While the latter feelings may be significant, by themselves they do not constitute
psychopathology.”).
171. Gail Erlick Robinson et al., Is There an “Abortion Trauma Syndrome”?: Critiquing the
Evidence, 17 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 268, 271 (2009).
172. Eva M. Dadlez & William L. Andrews, Post-Abortion Syndrome: Creating an Afflic-
tion, 24 BIOETHICS 445, 446 (2010).
173. Maroney, supra note 41, at 891 (“To say that a person—whether oneself or an-
other—regrets (or is likely to regret) an event is to make a cognitive judgment about
the attributes of that event.”).
174. Greasley, supra note 127.
175. Id. at 706 (emphasis removed).
2014] A B O R T E D  E M O T I O N S 33
choice advocacy organizations and mental health research often fail to effec-
tively distinguish between these two concepts.
In their fact sheets and briefing papers, most pro-choice organizations
do not differentiate between emotions and psychopathologies, often group-
ing them under the umbrella concept of “mental health” or “well-being.”
Pro-choice publications usually categorize regret under the overarching,
clinical-sounding term “mental health” issues. For example, a Guttmacher
Institute advisory paper states “the highest-quality research available does
not support the hypothesis that abortion leads to long-term mental health
problems. Lingering post-abortion feelings of sadness, guilt, regret, and de-
pression appear to occur in only a minority of women.”176 Similarly, a pub-
lication by NARAL Pro-Choice America refers to “psychological well-
being,” “depression,” “low self-esteem,” “mental health,” “psychological
risks,” “psychological trauma,” “negative psychological responses,” and
“mental disorders” without explaining these umbrella concepts, although it
references studies that do differentiate regret and other emotions from
clinical distress.177
Other pro-choice sources suggest regret is equivalent to (and therefore
potentially as problematic as) psychopathology. To illustrate, a National
Abortion Federation fact sheet counters the “myth” that “many women
come to regret their abortions later,” asserting that “[r]esearch indicates that
relief is the most common emotional response following abortion” and
states “psychological distress appears to be greatest before, rather than after,
an abortion.”178
Finally, a few publications refer to both regret and clinical distress as
“emotion” or “emotional well-being” instead of as “mental health” issues. A
Center for Reproductive Rights briefing paper, for instance, refers to
women’s “emotional well-being” and states there is no scientific or medical
evidence of PAS.179 Similarly, a Planned Parenthood fact sheet conflates psy-
176. GUTTMACHER INST., GUTTMACHER ADVISORY: ABORTION AND MENTAL HEALTH
(2011) (quoting Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-term Mental Health
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 439
(2008)), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/media/evidencecheck/2011/01/31/
Advisory-Abortion-Mental-Health.pdf.
177. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., CONGRESS SHOULD NOT LEGITIMIZE THE MYTHICAL
“POST-ABORTION SYNDROME” (2012), available at http://www.pro-choiceamerica
.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-mythical-post-abortion-syndrome.pdf.
178. SUSAN DUDLEY, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, WOMEN WHO HAVE ABORTIONS
(2003), available at http://www.pro-choice.org/about_abortion/facts/women_who
.html.
179. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE FACTS ON
SOME POPULAR MYTHS ABOUT ABORTION 2 (2005), available at http://reproduc-
tiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_bp_tk_myths.pdf. Both that brief-
34 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 21:1
chopathology and “emotional problems,” emphasizing that most studies
have concluded abortion is “a relatively benign procedure in terms of emo-
tional effect—except when pre-abortion emotional problems exist or when
a wanted pregnancy is terminated. . . .”180 The fact sheet also includes re-
gret181 under the category of an “emotional effect” along with several other
emotional and clinical conditions such as “relief,” “adverse psychological
effects,” “higher self-esteem,” “greater feelings of worth and capableness,”
“fewer feelings of failure,” “psychological problems or regrets,” and “less
distress or regret.”182
But pro-choice organizations are not alone in conflating regret with
clinical distress. Psychological and psychiatric research often includes both
regret and clinical distress in reported outcomes and comingles them in
results.183 As Major observes, “[m]ost studies . . . fail to distinguish between
clinically significant mental health outcomes (such as depression or psycho-
sis) and feelings of sadness, loss, or regret, which, although unpleasant, do
not necessarily signify a psychiatric disorder.”184 For example, the authors of
one psychological study speak of emotions and clinical symptomatology to-
gether, describing them in terms of negative and positive reactions differing
ing paper and another by the National Abortion Federation assert that research
studies have “concluded that while some women may experience regret, sadness or
guilt after an abortion, the overwhelming responses are positive feelings of relief and
happiness.” Id.; see also RENE ALMELING & LAUREN TEWS, NAT’L ABORTION
FED’N, POST-ABORTION ISSUES (1999), available at http://www.prochoice.org/
pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/post_abortion_issues.pdf.
180. Jon Knowles, The Emotional Effects of Induced Abortion, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/resources/research-papers/emotional-effects-in-
duced-abortion-6137.htm (last updated Jan. 18, 2007).
181. Id. (“Up to 98 percent of the women who have abortions have no regrets and would
make the same choice again in similar circumstances.”).
182. See id.
183. For example, one article states, “most women do not experience psychological
problems or regret their abortion 2 years postabortion, but some do. Those who do
tend to be women with a prior history of depression.” Major et al., Psychological
Responses, supra note 23, at 777; see also Adler et al., Psychological Responses, supra note
23; Major et al., supra note 155, at 869; Greasley, supra note 127, at 706.
184. Major et al., Psychological Responses, supra note 23, at 777–78; see also Robinson et
al., supra note 171; Adler et al., Psychological Factors, supra note 24, at 1197 (critiqu-
ing the methodological shortcomings of abortion research, including a dispropor-
tionate focus on negative outcomes and including a single question rating post-
decision regret as a measure of a psychological disorder).
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in severity.185 Similarly, mental health researchers may imply a connection
or parity between clinical distress and regret.186
The reason for distinguishing regret from psychopathology is to pro-
duce more rigorous scientific research, not to omit emotion; as Major et al.
assert, “[a]lthough sadness and regret are not psychological disorders, these
feelings should not be dismissed.”187 Regret and other emotions are un-
equivocally part of the constellation of mental health outcomes of abor-
tion.188 Although intense or severe reactions should receive professional
attention, not every “negative” emotion is pathological; women “do not
need to be protected from their emotional responses to abortion.”189 Con-
sistently differentiating regret from psychopathology also would make it
harder to substantiate PAS.190
Distinguishing regret from psychopathology supports relational auton-
omy by expanding the range of “normal” emotional reactions and by inti-
mating women need not experience post-abortion clinical distress. This
distinction provides more space for women to determine which relations are
most important and how best to protect them, allowing women to value the
fetal relationship as they wish. Thus, this distinction would ultimately
bridge chasms between social scripts and lived experience—because few
women experience intense post-abortion regret—most undergo an emo-
tional reaction and not clinical distress.191 Thus, most women, their emo-
tional reactions, and their relational valuations cannot be described as
pathological. Women can acknowledge that something “good” was lost even
as they affirm their abortions as the right decision.
To illustrate, let us compare two possible regret experiences. Anna be-
comes pregnant and decides against abortion even though her partner dis-
agrees and leaves her; she regrets that relational loss even as she remains
confident about her choice. Zoe becomes pregnant and chooses to terminate
185. Zoe Bradshaw & Pauline Slade, The Effects of Induced Abortion on Emotional Exper-
iences and Relationships: A Critical Review of the Literature, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
REV. 929, 930 (2003) (“Reviews of work prior to 1990 suggested that distress (such
as depression, anxiety and guilt) occurred most frequently and was greatest before
abortion. . . . Early studies also suggested that positive reactions were reported by the
majority of women in the longer term, with relief frequently being described.”).
186. One article states that, “a recent study from the US has [sic] shown that most
women do not experience psychological problems or regret their abortion 2 years
post-abortion. . . . [A]mbivalent feelings did not necessarily imply that women and
men regretted the abortion or experienced emotional distress.” Kero et al., supra note
38, at 2560.
187. Major et al., Psychological Responses, supra note 23, at 781.
188. See Major et al., supra note 155, at 869; Dadlez & Andrews, supra note 172, at 447.
189. Weitz et al., supra note 8, at 88.
190. See Dadlez & Andrews, supra note 172, at 446–47, 452.
191. See generally Major et al., supra note 155.
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her pregnancy; she, too, regrets that relational loss even as she remains con-
fident she chose well. A pro-life script would be more likely to classify Zoe’s
reaction as at least short-sighted and potentially pathological because of her
apparent disregard for the fetal connection, while it is likely to regard
Anna’s loss as unfortunate but celebrate her presumed attachment to the
fetus. From that perspective, Zoe appears to lack autonomy, and Anna ap-
pears to be autonomous. A pro-choice script would support both Anna and
Zoe’s right and ability to choose. Yet, these assumptions might be altogether
false; Zoe might have chosen abortion because she thought that was the
most responsible option for her fetus, and Anna might have chosen birth
because she was too scared to do otherwise. A relational approach recognizes
and accommodates these nuances.
B. Mistake 2: Confusing Regret and Remorse
The second common mistake within abortion jurisprudence and con-
ventional abortion scripts is conflating regret with the related, yet distinct,
emotion of remorse. Correcting this error does not require us to extricate
regret’s semantics from those of remorse, but to decouple regret from pre-
sumptions of mistake and/or moral culpability.
Gonzales v. Carhart is the first Supreme Court abortion case to explic-
itly link regret to abortion; Justice Kennedy infamously married regret to
gore and flawed decision making.192 Prior cases implicitly couple regret and
abortion by allowing states to “educate” women about additional concerns
in the name of informed consent so as to make the best decisions possible—
in other words, decisions they are least likely to regret.193 One of the purposes
of informed consent is to avoid harm and promote autonomy—thereby ob-
viating regret—through active, engaged, and informed participation in deci-
sion making.194 In Carhart, Kennedy defines regret as a woman’s “grief” and
“sorrow” over a gruesome procedure effecting the loss of a previous relation-
ship—her maternal bond with the “unborn child”—and juxtaposes regret
against a “bond of love.”195 Ironically, the opinion simultaneously highlights
isolation and relation, emphasizing both women’s individualized regret ex-
perience and the maternal-fetal relationship. When this relationship is ter-
minated by abortion, regret supposedly ensues because the woman is left
alone and lonely, bereft of the fetal bond.
192. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
193. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983); see
also id. at 423 n.5.; cf. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 764 (1986).
194. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 57, at 77.
195. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
2014] A B O R T E D  E M O T I O N S 37
Carhart constructs regret very differently than social science research.
In Carhart, regret is a negative emotion to be minimized and if possible
avoided, a reaction from which women must be protected. In other models,
however, regret is part of critical judgment, and an inescapable human expe-
rience.196 Through this lens, the Supreme Court’s view of regret is myopic.
The reaction that Carhart and activist scripts discuss actually is remorse, not
regret. This entanglement of regret and remorse is a consequence of not
applying relational autonomy to abortion decision making.
Unlike remorse, regret need not imply that someone has acted badly
and thus does not inherently entail defective action.197 Implicit in Carhart is
an image of women who procure a “partial-birth abortion” as morally cul-
pable because they voluntarily “chose” to abort their “later-term” child
through such a “gruesome”198 procedure, producing “grief” and “sor-
row,”199feelings of remorse. By confusing remorse and regret, the majority
ironically ascribes more autonomy to women who obtain intact D & X200
abortions (or, perhaps, all abortions)201 than it likely intends; women who
feel remorse would own the abortion as their own voluntary decision and
acknowledge it was morally wrong. Explicitly, the Court’s reasoning is that
women must be protected from their “regret”202 (really, remorse) because
they cannot comprehend the emotional consequences of undergoing intact
D & X or do not know what the procedure entails. This proposition is
196. Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When,
and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, 380 (1995).
197. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 43 (1986).
198. See Appleton, supra note 3, at 265 (stating the Court used the Cano amicus brief to
“bolster the opinion’s earlier paragraphs on the brutality and gruesomeness of the
abortion procedure it calls ‘intact D & E.’”).
199. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159–160.
200. In intact D & X abortions, more controversially termed “partial-birth” abortions, a
physician attempts to remove the fetus intact. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 136–38.
201. Legal scholars have noted Carhart’s reasoning appears to extend beyond “partial-
birth” abortion; Susan Frelich Appleton observes that, by relying upon the Cano
amicus brief (which describes the trauma and distress of 178 women who underwent
an abortion as well as the experiences of Sandra Cano, the plaintiff “Mary Doe”
from the companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973)), “the Court both overshoots and undershoots its mark. The opin-
ion implicates all abortions, not just those banned by the challenged statute; yet it
also fails to take into account what could be learned from the full range of judicial
treatments of regret in other reproductive settings.” Appleton, supra note 3, at 265.
202. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
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shockingly improbable, given the level of “informed consent” currently
mandated by state governments.203
A relational autonomy model reveals not only that there are at least
two different emotions—regret and remorse—at play, but also how they are
strategically used in distinct ways and play singular roles in abortion scripts.
The liberal autonomy model emphasizes maintaining or regaining control
of one’s life. In an unwanted pregnancy, the goal of regaining control can
set the woman in opposition to her fetus, as this goal can include regaining
control over one’s body, necessitating the fetus’s removal. In a relational
autonomy model, the critical issue is not control or domination; we cannot
compel good decisions from women by foreclosing options, fixing relational
hierarchies, or scripting emotions. These actions undermine, rather than
enhance, relational autonomy.
Moreover, control is not often compatible with pregnancy, much to
the despair of women who seek it or seek to avoid it.204 Control is central
for conventional attributions of responsibility; it is harder to hold a woman
responsible for something that was not within her power to change.205 As a
bodily process, pregnancy is rarely within a woman’s control. Abstinence is
an unrealistic and unworkable permanent solution for most adults,206 and
203. For a current list of state regulations in force throughout the United States, see State
Center: State Facts About Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher
.org/statecenter/sfaa.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
204. Pregnancy is “dominated by involuntary movements and noncontrolled processes.”
SARA HEINA¨MAA, TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE: HUSSERL,
MERLEAU-PONTY, BEAUVOIR 131 (2003). For instance, experiences of infertility,
unwanted conception, and pregnancy complications can all lead to feelings of bodily
failure and a lack of control. See M. Christina Alcalde, ‘To Make It Through Each Day
Still Pregnant’: Pregnancy, Bed Rest, and the Disciplining of the Maternal Body, 20.3 J.
GENDER STUD. 209, 210, 212 (2011); Arthur L. Greil, NOT YET PREGNANT: IN-
FERTILE COUPLES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 54, 55, 73–74, 80–83, 96–98
(1991) (discussing women’s perceived lack of control over infertility and efforts to
regain control through fertility treatment); Caroline Lundquist, Being Torn: Toward a
Phenomenology of Unwanted Pregnancy 23 HYPATIA 136, 142 (2008) (“Pregnancy
epitomizes this dreadful ambiguity; the pregnant subject, willingly or unwillingly, is
seized by an alien teleology.”).
205. See generally JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CON-
TROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1999).
206. Abstinence as a form of sex education has abysmal “user-failure” rates; users do not
comport with its “basic tenet . . . do not have sex,” leading to the adage “vows of
abstinence break far more easily than latex condoms.” Katherine Carroll, Note, Chil-
dren’s Lives as a Political Battleground: The Plague of Abstinence Only Education, 3
DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 41, 49 (2009); see also MICHAEL J. HARTWIG, THE
POETICS OF INTIMACY AND THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABSTINENCE (2010) (con-
cluding that long-term abstinence is harmful).
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no other method of birth control is perfectly effective.207 Control and re-
sponsibility fix our attention on the circumstances in which pregnancies
begin—a vantage point useful in helping to prevent future unwanted
pregnancies but not so much for dealing with existing ones. In an unwanted
pregnancy, we should not seek to hold a woman responsible for her actions,
but encourage her to make responsible choices. Relational autonomy prof-
fers a more realistic, flexible, and compassionate alternative: instead of de-
manding control, we should use creative resources to respond to an
unforeseen event. Under this model, regret can signify autonomous
choice—a creative, thoughtful, considered, reflexive, and subjective exercise.
Regret and remorse also bear upon women’s embedded and embodied
statuses. In pro-life scripts, a woman who does not feel regret or remorse is
at best misguided and not autonomous and at worst something of a moral
monster.208 In pro-choice scripts, a woman who does feel regret or remorse
seems at best confused and non-autonomous and at worst a traitor to
women’s rights or feminism.209 These scripts simultaneously demand too
much from women and give them too little credit. Normatively insisting on
a certain emotional reaction—regret or remorse, no regret or remorse—
backs some women into corners of unrealistic, unfamiliar, and uncomforta-
ble characterizations, producing wariness, discomfort, fear, and defensive-
ness.210 With more emotional space, women are not laced into the one-size-
fits-all affective corset sewn by current abortion scripts. A relational auton-
omy model, on the other hand, posits that autonomy is always partial,
choice is always constrained, and no fixed relational value or hierarchy ex-
ists. While we can improve decisional opportunities or options, we can
never remove all constraints. In a relational model, remorse that indicates
deficient decision making actually prompts us to recognize what went
wrong and evolve new perspectives, spurring growth in our capacity for au-
207. See Appleton, supra note 3, at 295–96; see also Diana Mansour, Pirjo Inki & Kristina
Gemzell-Danielsson, Efficacy of Contraceptive Methods: A Review of the Literature, 15
EUROPEAN J. CONTRACEPTION & REPROD. HEALTH CARE 4, 7 (2010) (charting
the efficacy of various methods of birth control). Vasalgel, a long-acting but revers-
ible new method of male birth control, is reportedly “100% effective” and com-
pleted in clinical trials in India but is awaiting large-scale funding to begin American
clinical trials. Bill Gifford, The Revolutionary New Birth Control Technique, WIRED,
Apr. 26, 2011, available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/04/ff_vasectomy/
all/1; Dave Smith, New Male Birth Control is 100 Percent Effective, Completely Revers-
ible, INT’L BUS. TIMES, May 7, 2012, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/new-
male-birth-control-procedure-100-percent-effective-completely-reversible-study-
697179.
208. See Keys, supra note 21, at 41–42.
209. See supra Part I.B.
210. See supra notes 41–44.
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tonomy. The model also enhances our understandings of how emotions are
mediated by social relations that might trigger, intensify, or quell feelings.
Explicating the lived experience of the abortion decision—how
women and their choices are socially embedded, physically embodied, and
relationally mediated—also reveals the invidious “real life” consequences of
confusing regret with remorse. Social scripts fail to distinguish between situ-
ations involving regret and those involving remorse, creating a terrible and
unfortunate muddle. For example, take three hypotheticals involving sex
and unplanned pregnancy:
(a) A pregnant twenty-five-year-old woman has an abortion and
is confident that it was the right decision. When she is
thirty-two she learns that she is unable to conceive biological
children.
(b) A pregnant twenty-five-year-old woman has an abortion af-
ter rape despite deep conviction that it violates her religious
beliefs. She later believes that this decision was wrong.
(c) A pregnant twenty-five-year-old woman plans to keep her
pregnancy. Her boyfriend gives her the abortion pill Cytotec
and tells her it is amoxicillin that she must take for an infec-
tion. Believing him, she takes one Cytotec pill and unwit-
tingly aborts the pregnancy.211
In hypothetical (a), the woman is likely to feel regret, whereas in (b), she is
likely to feel remorse and indeed might feel remorse even if she experienced
relief. In hypothetical (c), the abortion can be traced not to the woman’s
consciously chosen actions but to a deceitful partner; she very may well feel
remorse because, although she did not intend the abortion, it nonetheless
took place through her actions. The pro-life script ties sex to procreation
and procreative actions and so links “responsibility” for pregnancy to both
pregnancy as a physical state and consensual sexual activity that can engen-
der conception, intimating that the women in (a) and (b) should feel re-
sponsibility and regret. The pro-choice script, however, links sex to pleasure,
not procreation;212 under these rules, we do not attribute “responsibility” or
regard these women as morally duty-bound to experience regret.
211. See, e.g., Katherine Hobson, OB-GYNs Told to Look for ‘Reproductive Coercion’, NPR
(Jan. 23, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/23/1700887
86/ob-gyns-told-to-look-for-reproductive-coercion.
212. See supra Part I.B.
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C. Mistake 3: Confining Regret to the Abortion Decision
The third mistake is confining the regret experience to the abortion
decision instead of situating it within a broader temporal context potentially
beginning long before the unwanted pregnancy and potentially ending long
after. The moment of the abortion decision comes to define women consid-
ering abortion; Carhart’s central character is the “mother who comes to
regret her choice to abort.”213 The (over)emphasis of this event echoes lib-
eral autonomy’s emphases on choice, individualism, and control. Tying re-
gret to the abortion decision overlooks that women can feel regret
beforehand, potentially influencing decision making. It also mischaracterizes
“choice” as a moment in time when in fact it is a process women experience
with varying emotions and complete in varying time periods.214
Regret is equally likely to arise from events other than the abortion
decision. An unwanted pregnancy can suggest a lack of control, a failure of
responsibility, and an inability to direct one’s life course—all factors poten-
tially correlated with flawed autonomy.215 In addition, it reinforces the con-
nection between regret and defective decision making. In qualitative studies,
women often report remorse or disappointment with getting pregnant in
the first place and discuss lapses of responsibility or control. One research
participant viewed her pregnancy as “a failure to care for and protect both
other and self.”216 A perceived lack of responsibility could also stem from
problems procuring contraception. Another participant felt “helpless and
powerless” because she could not afford contraception, thought she needed
parental consent, felt unable to withstand her boyfriend’s harassing requests
for sex, and was afraid he would break off the relationship if she refused.
Thus, this young woman believed that “she became pregnant because no
one was willing to help.”217
Acknowledging that the abortion decision, like its maker, is socially
embedded obliges us to consider a thickness of relations not only when the
decision is made, but also through time, before and after the decision.
Though isolated by social scripts, the abortion decision is only one event in
a trajectory of relationships, interactions, and decisions stretching up to and
beyond the choice. Associated emotions, including regret, are not fused only
to the abortion decision but are also embedded in social scripts and specific
213. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 127, 159 (2007).
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. See Lundquist, supra note 204, at 142.
216. GILLIGAN, supra note 131, at 94.
217. Id. at 109.
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human interactions, and may pervade this entire trajectory.218 As Maroney
asserts:
Abortion is, for most, a heavy-heart event; that much is safe to
generalize. . . . [a woman who terminates her pregnancy] may be
angry or resentful at having been impregnated and put in the
position of having to choose; she may be fearful of the effect an
unwanted child would have on her life; she may be embarrassed
by failing to prevent the pregnancy; she may be anxious about
the medical procedure; she may feel hurt that others did not
support her in the way she wanted; she may feel sadness that she
did not feel capable of having a child at that moment.219
A relational perspective broadens our focus from the abortion decision
standing alone to an extended survey of events.
Recognizing that women can experience regret before deciding illus-
trates that regret is different from and can accompany remorse. Regret can
infuse several other events and relationships surrounding a triggering inci-
dent. Even if one can identify regret’s initial “cause,” it cannot be isolated
from its social context.220 If a woman simultaneously regrets having to make
the abortion decision and affirms that abortion was the right choice, her
regret experience may bleed into associated events. Emotions related to one
issue or event seep into other moments and contexts; they cannot be neatly
attached to and confined within discrete incidents, so that we feel regret
only when we think of its specific cause.
Disentangling remorse from regret prompts us to analyze how the
abortion decision is connected to other behaviors and relationships. While
an unwanted pregnancy and abortion decision can generate painful emo-
tions, we cannot presume that these emotions spring from only one source.
Research concludes emotional distress following abortion is more often re-
lated to an unwanted pregnancy than its termination.221 As one female par-
218. Significantly, many women’s reactions to abortions are heavily influenced by na-
tional culture. Women may have very different reactions in countries where abor-
tions are a more routine form of birth control, few obstacles are present, and stigma
is diminished. See generally Henry P. David, Abortion in Europe, 1920–1991: A Pub-
lic Health Perspective, 23 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 1 (1992). Yet, when abortion is banned,
contraceptives are unavailable, stigma and guilt can be heightened. See generally Mary
Boyle & Jane McEvoy, Putting Abortion in Its Social Context: Northern Irish Women’s
Experiences of Abortion in England, 2 HEALTH 283 (1998).
219. Maroney, supra note 41, at 897–98.
220. See supra Part I.A. for a description of how feeling rules are embedded in social
contexts.
221. Kero et al., supra note 38, at 2568.
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ticipant remarked, “I was not glad that I was faced with an unwanted,
unplanned pregnancy, however [sic] I am glad that I made the decision to
have an abortion.”222 Again, a woman’s ambivalent feelings about an abor-
tion do not always translate into regretting the abortion or emotional dis-
tress.223 Broadening regret’s experiential frame incorporates past and future
events and opportunities, reveals how a women may recognize other non-
abortive options as valuable but not viable, and illustrates why no choice
may seem entirely “good.”
D. Mistake 4: Limiting Regret to the Maternal-Fetal Relationship and
Women’s Self-Commitment
The fourth mistake is confining regret to two relationships: the mater-
nal-fetal relationship and women’s commitment to self-care224 and well-be-
ing. The maternal-fetal relationship gives the abortion decision its
pragmatic and moral weight. Each is necessary for the other’s existence; the
physical maternal-fetal relationship is a precursor to the abortion decision,
which determines that relationship’s continued active existence.
Both pro-life and pro-choice scripts are explicitly or implicitly respon-
sive to valuations of the maternal-fetal relationship. This relationship is
front and center in the pro-life script; the pregnant woman is a mother
intimately connected to her fetus, and its singular importance is conveyed
partially through regret/remorse.225 In pro-choice scripts, the maternal-fetal
relationship is more “hidden”; pregnant women are not referred to as
“mothers,” and a woman is advised to consider her relationship with her-
self.226 In reality, these relations are only two out of many possible connec-
tions women may appraise as less, equally, or more significant.227 As Linda
Layne observes, the “distinction between a fetus and a baby is defined not
by gestational development but through social relationships—the pregnant
woman’s with her fetus, her family, and her community.”228
The pro-life script has a much more complete, consistent, and inflexi-
ble picture of how this relationship should be handled than its pro-choice
counterpart. Cases of rape, incest, or maternal physical health aside,229 there
222. West, supra note 60, at 32.
223. Kero et al., supra note 38, at 2560.
224. This would include a self-relationship, including dedication to values and achieving
life goals.
225. Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, supra note 111.
226. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 31.
227. See supra note 113.
228. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 42 (citing Layne, I Remember the Day, supra note 114).
229. These controversial cases are not often the subject of conventional scripts, and more
social conservatives would permit abortion in those circumstances. See WALTER SIN-
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is a clear, objective choice—birth—that is right, and another—abortion—
that is wrong. Here, the maternal-fetal relationship becomes a monumental
force inspiring reverence that turns women’s gaze away from abortion and
towards birth. The pro-life script grounds the maternal-fetal relationship’s
importance in personhood, constructing it as a tie between two unique,
though not separate, people. If the fetus is a person, it is no great leap of
logic to consider it a child that the mother would not harm.
This narrow construction, however, actually shrinks and weakens the
maternal-fetal relationship in two ways. First, it ignores how this relation-
ship acquires power not only from its participants’ identities but from the
crucial roles it plays across so many vastly different reproductive contexts,
including birth, adoption, and assisted reproduction. The role of the
mother in the maternal-fetal relationship is continuously in flux in each
pregnancy and across prenatal contexts and extends beyond the pregnant
woman herself to others who enjoy different maternal roles, such as in-
tended adoptive mothers. To acknowledge the maternal-fetal relation is to
celebrate, at a minimum, both the fetus and the pregnant woman.
Second, this construction opposes the maternal-fetal relationship to
women’s self-commitment, setting a “choice” and a “child” against one an-
other. This is a false contrast; these relationships are inherently interdepen-
dent. Each is in tension with yet enriches the other, irrespective of whether a
woman terminates her pregnancy. The pro-life script posits that a woman’s
most significant commitment is to her fetus. Consequently, it suggests ei-
ther that pursuing the maternal-fetal relationship will deepen or enrich the
woman’s self-relationship or that the woman’s self-relationship should be
subordinated or denied in favor of the fetus. In contrast, the pro-choice
script prioritizes the woman’s commitment to herself, asserts there is noth-
ing inherently remorseful about obtaining an abortion, and celebrates free-
dom of choice, but is necessarily vague about whether a commitment to the
fetus exists and how profound that commitment is or should be (that is left
to the woman), implying only that the woman need not prioritize it above
all else. Because it embraces a woman’s subjective valuation of the maternal-
fetal relationship, the pro-choice script is largely silent as to its worth, and
this silence may be taken as weakness.
Moreover, in each script, the interplay between regret and the mater-
nal-fetal relationship has profound implications for the autonomy ascribed
NOTT-ARMSTRONG & ROBERT FOGELIN, UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS 387
(2010) (stating that many people who oppose abortion permit it “when it is neces-
sary to save the life of the mother” and that “[m]any pro-life conservatives admit that
abortion is also justified when the pregnancy results from rape or incest”). These are
the same situations in which some states provide public funding for abortion. See
infra note 303.
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to the woman as decision maker. In the pro-life script, regret signals that a
woman did not act autonomously. A woman who chooses abortion is pre-
sumed to deprioritize the fetal relation because of deficient decision making
(insufficient information, ignorance about the sacred nature of the mater-
nal-fetal bond, etc.), rendering her a victim. A woman can demonstrate an
expanded capacity for autonomy if she later experiences regret and is moti-
vated to acknowledge her mistake. In contrast, the pro-choice script posits
that a woman is an autonomous decision maker and usually does not (and
normatively should not) feel regret, presumably because she makes good
choices. Here, regret could result from numerous autonomy-crushing rea-
sons such as insufficient reflection, co-optation into gendered stereotypes, or
junk science. Critically, both of these scripts differ from a woman’s lived
experience of an abortion decision, where she is embedded in a complex
web of associations beyond the maternal-fetal connection and is free to as-
sign different values and priorities to them all.230
Fettering regret to both the abortion decision and the maternal-fetal
relationship produces contradictions, not clarity. The maternal-fetal rela-
tionship is not confined to the abortion decision, nor does it derive all of its
meaning from that context. Women’s attitudes towards their pregnancies—
wanted and unwanted—are not static and evolve and change over time. A
pregnancy that is wanted can become unwanted, and vice versa. Nor is
abortion an outcome for only unwanted pregnancies.231
A relational model illustrates why current pro-life social scripts seem
more compelling than their pro-choice counterparts. Counterfactuals
demonstrate how regret’s semantic, emotional, social, and cultural content
and capital can vary with reproductive context. Comparing pro-life and pro-
choice counterfactuals is practically impossible, an apples-to-oranges en-
deavor: “Anti-abortion advocates have managed to frame the debate in
strictly moral terms, basically life versus lifestyle, which can make opposing
arguments sound hollow and legalistic.”232
The pro-life counterfactual is immediately recognizable in advocacy
literature—a lonely woman wanders solemnly by schools or through play-
grounds, considering her past and the child who might have been born. But
230. See supra note 113.
231. The most obvious example of women who choose to abort wanted pregnancies is in
the case of fetal anomaly. See Jeffrey S. Dungan & Lee P. Shulman, Abortion for Fetal
Abnormalities or Maternal Conditions, in MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED AND AB-
NORMAL PREGNANCY: COMPREHENSIVE ABORTION CARE 302 (Maureen Paul et al.
eds., 2009).
232. Andrew Rosenthal, Does It Mean Anything That a Record Low Are ‘Pro-Choice’?, N.Y.
TIMES TAKING NOTE BLOG (May 23, 2012, 3:12 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.ny
times.com/2012/05/23/does-it-mean-anything-that-a-record-low-are-pro-choice/.
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pro-choice rhetoric lacks a culturally viable counterfactual; obvious candi-
dates feature women who give birth and experience differences in career,
lifestyle, or marital quality. The woman who pushes a stroller and mourns a
lost career is simply not as culturally compelling. A powerful counterfactual
opposes the maternal-fetal relationship to a woman’s self-commitment,
counterposes “killing” a “child” to “killing” a career, and compares regret
over not having a child to regret over having a child.233 These are difficult
comparisons in Western culture where there is a “parental duty to affirm the
life of her child” that renders parental regret inappropriate.234 Mothers can
of course experience regret but are under a cultural and social imperative
not to acknowledge it.235 Perhaps more effective pro-choice counterfactuals
would focus on how abortions took place before Roe236 and would occur if
Roe were overturned, redirecting attention from abortion to preventing un-
wanted pregnancy.237
A relational conception of regret broadens the range of relationships
that women can normatively consider in the abortion decision, legitimates
and accommodates a more complex emotional experience, and allows
women to prioritize and assign value to a multiplicity of relationships. It
adjusts to women’s actual lived experiences, making room for women who
want to pursue the maternal-fetal relationship but on different terms;
women who end the maternal-fetal relationship to protect other relation-
ships with the already born, unborn, or yet-to-be conceived; or women who
recognize that something precious is lost and mourn the potential for life
but do not grieve the maternal relation. If women choose abortion and
thereafter experience regret, that does not mean they made the wrong deci-
sion or that they did not appreciate the maternal-fetal relationship, assign
value to it, or reject it. A woman might elect not to continue this relation
because she cherishes it. One can cherish a relationship that one terminates
in the particular as well as in the abstract. For instance, a single mother with
a child with special needs and a full-time job who unexpectedly becomes
pregnant may view her decision to abort as the most loving and responsible
act towards her fetus when she knows she lacks the time, physical and emo-
tional energy, and money to parent.
233. Greasley, supra note 127, at 709, 710.
234. Id. at 709.
235. This attitude is implicit in profound judicial reluctance to recognize “wrongful life”
causes of action in torts, where one or both parents sue a doctor or hospital for
failing to provide information about the fetus or pregnancy that would have allowed
the woman to have an abortion. See, e.g., Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d
755 (N.J. 1984). See generally ALMOND, supra note 162.
236. See Waldo L. Fielding, Repairing the Damage, Before Roe, N.Y. TIMES (June 3,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/health/views/03essa.html.
237. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22, at 175-76.
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E. Mistake 5: Coupling Regret with Deficient Decision Making
The fifth mistake, coupling regret with deficient decision making, is
intertwined with the others; together, these missteps explain how certain
choices to abort are seen as “defective,” and why these defects warrant re-
gret. Regret’s intensity—its status as emotion or pathology—signals defi-
ciency, and the overwhelming importance placed on the maternal-fetal
relationship grounds its seriousness. Confining regret to the abortion deci-
sion isolates this moment, making it easier to classify a choice as right or
wrong.
In the pro-life script, regret is a “damned if you do feel it, damned if
you don’t” experience. This script legitimates regret only when women
choosing abortion come to appreciate it as “wrong.” They offer respite to a
woman who acknowledges her “mistake” but not to women who believe
abortion is the “right” choice but anticipate regret for having to make it.
Anticipatory regret that does not deter a woman from abortion is viewed as
false because “genuine” regret supposedly prompts a woman to change her
mind. As a pro-life ideal, regret is a redemptive emotion—cathartic, cleans-
ing, and purifying. A woman who does not feel after the fact that she has
committed a grave error or who felt this way before the abortion but pro-
ceeded anyways is not entitled to redemption.
Conversely, pro-choice scripts and feeling rules have taken a reaction-
ary position on regret, making little to no room for it lest it legitimize the
pro-life platform.238 The pro-choice script counters the pro-life construction
with assertions that women feel relief and/or little to no distress,239 but it
does not explain what regret can mean or couple it to autonomous capacity.
Left unchallenged, the quality of the abortion decision acquires an absolu-
tist gloss, becoming a choice between “right” and “wrong” in which wrong-
ness connotes ignorance, immaturity, and even immorality.
Ultimately, the narrow understandings of regret and the abortion deci-
sion found within pro-life and pro-choice scripts and Carhart have a terrible
consequence. They obscure the unfortunate truth that sometimes a woman
feels that there is no wholly “right” outcome to a certain decision, and that
she must choose an option that is “right” only in that it is less objectionable
238. See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 152–53 (1991) (arguing that the pro-
choice movement’s “ability to bring about social change has been constructed since
1973 by the need to respond to countermovement activities and successes with
largely reactive and single-issue goals and tactics.”); see also SALETAN, supra note 6, at
2 (“Liberals haven’t won the struggle for abortion rights. Conservatives have.”).
239. See supra Part II.A.
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than others.240 In The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum observes that
certain decisions are tragic because they present no “right” choice; faced
with these decisions, one sacrifices something of value however one
chooses.241 In this context, regret is an honest reaction to a good outcome
that was lost but that had to be lost for one reason or other. From this
perspective, both the Supreme Court, pro-life, and pro-choice activists have
altogether mischaracterized regret. Accordingly, we must decouple regret
from the notion that one has made a “wrong” decision. Sometimes, regret is
an inevitable and healthy response to understanding the moral and relational
stakes of particular decisions—in short, a sign of autonomous decision
making.
Many women might find this “healthy” regret response to be true of
their lived experience of the abortion decision.242 The circumstances out of
which and in which abortion decisions are made are critical factors in deter-
mining how women experience it. As Weitz notes, “[i]n all of the discus-
sions about abortion and mental health, we must never lose track of
context. Women are likely to have complicated feelings about the aspects of
their lives that led up to the abortion decision: sex, contraception, partner-
ship status, economic conditions, motherhood potential, etc.”243
Coupling regret to defective decision making also affects how we see
the pregnant woman as a decision maker. The Supreme Court’s image of
the woman as a reproductive decision maker has changed over time from
Roe v. Wade to Carhart, marking the devolution, not the evolution, of au-
tonomous capacity. In Roe, the Supreme Court consigns the decision to the
doctor in consultation with his female patient.244 Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey states that, as between the woman and
her husband, the woman must prevail because the pregnancy implicates her
body.245 Carhart, however, removes both the woman and her doctor from
the decision-making process altogether; the Supreme Court steps into the
breach to protect women from an onslaught of negative emotion.246
240. See generally LESLIE CANNOLD, THE ABORTION MYTH: FEMINISM, MORALITY, AND
THE HARD CHOICES WOMEN MAKE (Wesleyan Univ. Press 2000) (explaining how,
for some women, abortion is not only a moral response, but it might be the only
moral response). See also Ludlow, Child and a Choice, supra note 10, at 27 (discuss-
ing the complexities of choice); Phillip Mitsis, Seneca on Reason, Rules and Moral
Development, in PASSIONS & PERCEPTIONS: STUDIES IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND 285, 307 (Jacques Brunschwig & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1993).
241. NUSSBAUM, supra note 197, at 34–35.
242. Maroney, supra note 41, at 898.
243. Weitz et al., supra note 8, at 88.
244. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
245. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895–96 (1992).
246. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
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According to Carhart, the problem with abortion decision making is
not merely “the subsequent rise of second thoughts but rather the absence
of full knowledge that would have been available at the outset.”247 Carhart
presumes women do not know the effects of the “late-term” abortion proce-
dure upon a fetus, are not effective in obtaining this information from their
doctors, or do not carefully think through their decision and its ramifica-
tions. All these assumptions reinforce insidious gender stereotypes of
women as “ignorant, naı¨ve . . . and emotionally fragile if not psychologically
unfit” and “co-opt . . . the premise of voluntary action underlying the usual
understandings of regret.”248 Here, regret paralyzes subjects instead of posi-
tioning or repositioning them in relation to their decision. Such assertions
also conflict with the idea that women are more relationally adept than
men, implying that those who choose abortion must be somehow
unnatural.249
These points have not been identified in the plethora of published
legal scholarship addressing regret since Carhart. Critical articles have fo-
cused on whether women experience regret as well as on the most egregious
parts of the opinion itself: “[T]he majority opinion’s paternalism, its use of
gender stereotypes, its reliance on unfounded generalizations, its misuse of
informed consent doctrine, its misunderstanding of psychological learning,
and its analytical overkill.”250 While these conclusions are laudable, we can
and must go further. The most relevant article to date, Chris Guthrie’s in-
sightful article “Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Re-
gret,” rehabilitates regret and corrects inaccuracies in the Carhart opinion,
but even it does not go far enough. Guthrie takes the Supreme Court to
task for its “fundamental misunderstanding” of the psychology of regret.251
He draws upon psychological research to show that the Supreme Court has
misunderstood regret by overlooking regret aversion (that a decision maker
will seek to avoid regret in making decisions), regret overestimation (that a
247. Appleton, supra note 3, at 267.
248. Id. at 267, 268.
249. The idea that women are more concerned with intimate relationships than men has
been the subject of much theoretical and empirical scholarship. This was the premise
behind the bestseller Men are From Mars, Women are From Venus. JOHN GRAY, MEN
ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (1992). It also is explicit within the
work of Carol Gilligan. See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 131. See also ALICE H.
EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION
(1987); Alice H. Eagly & Wendy Wood, The Origins of Sex Differences in Human
Behavior: Evolved Dispositions Versus Social Roles, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 408, 412–13
(1999); David L. Vogel et al., Confirming Gender Stereotypes: A Social Role Perspective,
48 SEX ROLES 519, 519–20 (2003).
250. Appleton, supra note 3, at 262.
251. See generally Guthrie, supra note 3.
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decision maker tends to overestimate regret’s intensity and duration), regret
dampening (that a decision maker has psychological tactics to minimize/
dampen experienced regret), and regret learning (that a decision maker
learns to make better future choices from the experience of regret).252
Adopting a relational perspective, however, provides a useful meta-
framework for the psychological research Guthrie cites and refocuses our
attention from the abortion decision to the social and relational contexts in
which it is situated. At one point, Guthrie links post-decision regret to the
likelihood women will try to avoid related regrets in the future, noting they
“might select different sexual partners, alter the sexual behavior they engage
in with their partners, use birth control, and so on.”253 This assertion, while
on-point, describes a behavioral change that does not merely follow from
the abortion decision or even from undergoing the procedure but instead is
a product of the entire sequence of pregnancy management events and rela-
tionships culminating in the abortion capstone.
A relational perspective would focus not on whether women feel regret
or why regret is useful, but on why some women experience regret and
which relational priorities are at stake (such as a partner’s opinion, the exis-
tence of other children and the pregnancy’s effect upon those relations, so-
cial expectations, etc.). It would query which relationships support
autonomous decision making, and how these characteristics can be fostered
by law, other institutions, and individuals.
The consequences of painting regret with a broader brush are expli-
cated by Susan Frelich Appleton in her recent article “Reproduction and
Regret,” which examines several models of regret across numerous reproduc-
tive contexts.254 She asserts that, because abortion requirements and proce-
dures are “products of state laws, reinforced by cultural constructs,” the state
helps to create and sustain abortion regret through abortion regulations.255
According to Appleton, “such laws both reflect and shape social forces that
become part of the background for the emotional experience, with abortion
decisions having ‘unusual cultural salience.’”256 Thus, she concludes:
Gonzales [v. Carhart]’s promise that law can rescue the vulnera-
ble among us from feelings of regret fails to acknowledge the role
of both law and culture in creating reasons why we experience
such feelings in the first place, just as it fails to acknowledge how
252. Id. at 881.
253. Id. at 902.
254. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 3, at 267.
255. Id. at 316–18.
256. Id. at 318.
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the abortion options that remain often present greater risks and
trauma than the procedure proscribed.257
An explicitly relational analysis shows why this is so; by acknowledging the
co-constructed roles of both law and culture, relationality demonstrates
these institutions are just one layer in a series of nested relations that con-
struct, regulate, and mediate our bodily experience and social interactions.
Disentangling regret from defective decision making requires delving
into what it means to consent to an abortion—an inquiry plunging right
into the center of the maelstrom of social scripts, state regulations, informed
consent protocols, a woman’s lived experience of pregnancy, her emotions,
and her relations with partner, peers, family, community, institutions, cul-
ture, and government. Consent to the abortion decision should not be seen
as a switch either flipped on or off; instead it is more like a spectrum, rang-
ing from an unreserved consent to consent shaded by doubts to tentative
consent to refusal shaded by doubts to affirmative refusal.
Abortion has a number of ugly truths. One of them is that many
abortions are prompted by social conditions, social scripts, and social pres-
sures that have removed a robust safety net of formal and informal supports
that should exist and, in fact, do exist in other, primarily European, coun-
tries.258 Abortions are disproportionately higher among low-income women
and women of color.259 This is a good indicator that at least some women
are electing abortion because they feel they cannot materially provide for the
child they would bear.260 Thus, analogizing to Robin West’s theory of “con-
sented but unwanted sex,”261 we can discuss the “consented but unwanted
abortion.” I use this term knowing that a “wanted abortion” may lack co-
herence for women who are not considering abortion.
According to West, “consented but unwanted sex” occurs when heter-
osexual females consent to sex they do not desire in diverse relationships, to
satisfy diverse needs, and with diverse motivations.262 Certain harms are in-
257. Id.
258. See generally Jane Waldfogel, International Policies Toward Parental Leave and Child
Care, 11 CARING FOR INFANTS & TODDLERS 99 (2001) (highlighting the variety of
child care-related supports in Europe, versus the relatively minimal supports offered
in the United States).
259. STANLEY K. HENSHAW & KATHRYN KOST, GUTTMACHER INST., TRENDS IN THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN OBTAINING ABORTION, 1974–2004, at 1, 15
(2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/09/23/TrendsWomenAb
ortions-wTables.pdf; see also Ludlow, supra note 10, at 27.
260. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 27; see also Ludlow, supra note 104, at 33.
261. Robin West, Sex, Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 221, 236 (Alan Wertheimer & William Miller eds., 2008).
262. Id.
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herent risks of consented sex, such as disease and unwanted pregnancy, and
other types of harms can result but are not inevitable.263 West contends
women are not necessarily harmed by consenting to unwanted sex for di-
verse reasons such as love or “to cement trust, or to express gratitude.”264
But when sexual activity is both unwanted and unwelcome it is more likely
to harm women, damaging their “personhood, autonomy, integrity and
identity.”265 Such sex is physically invasive; damages self-sovereignty; alien-
ates a woman from her desires and pleasures; thwarts a “unified identity”;
trivializes conceptions of self, injuries, and importance in the world; threat-
ens the “largeness” of self and ambitions; and ultimately imperils
autonomy.266
Borrowing on this concept, a consented but unwanted abortion seems
like an oxymoron. We would expect a woman to consent to an abortion
because she “wants” it, but there is a difference between choosing an out-
come out of affirmative desire and choosing an outcome because it appears
to be the least harmful in a pool of toxic choices. Women who agree to a
consented but unwanted abortion might choose differently if circumstances
were other than what they are—if they had a healthy fetus, more economic
resources, greater flexibility with employment or education, or stronger so-
cial supports to make parenthood a workable option. For some women, at
some times, a consented abortion will be unwanted but still welcome be-
cause of the trade-offs a woman is ready to make; for other women, at other
times, it will be unwanted and unwelcome.267
Like unwanted and unwelcome sexual activity, an abortion that is
consented but unwanted and unwelcome harms women. This kind of abor-
tion is likely unwelcome because women may perceive it terminates the po-
tential for a new life and for new relationships. It does not matter if women
feel they must choose it to best safeguard the futures of themselves, signifi-
cant others, unborn fetuses, or other interests. Its harm lies in that it irrevo-
cably terminates a potential for life that these women valued.268 Women in
263. Id. at 237.
264. Id. at 239.
265. Id. at 234.
266. Id. at 238.
267. I do not include in the “unwanted and unwelcome” category the situation where a
woman with a “wanted” pregnancy elects abortion after learning her fetus is un-
healthy from prenatal testing. While this woman does not want to end her preg-
nancy, she decides to forego this relationship but will try to conceive at a later time. I
would describe this abortion as “consented but unwanted” because the woman is not
willing to continue a problematic pregnancy.
268. See David J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin’s Dominions: Investments, Memberships,
The Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEX. L. REV. 559, 601 (1994) (“[T]he
loss and pain of an abortion is the loss of a child that someone wanted, even if only
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these circumstances experience the most emotional distress from regret, re-
morse, guilt, shame, mourning, trauma, and other painful and negative
emotions.269 I do not mean to suggest that we make any decision without
constraints; all choices face some restrictions, and few, if any, of us make
decisions in ideal circumstances. Nonetheless, we should identify and work
to eliminate constraints with unjust consequences, particularly based on dis-
tinctions of race, gender, and class.270
Recognizing the category of “consented but unwanted” abortion ac-
knowledges women’s decisions are necessarily affected by relational consid-
erations (e.g., existing social and personal supports, effects of the pregnancy
and birth on self and others, and so on). It suggests the outcome might have
been different if key changes in relational supports were made (improved
access to child care, increased social support for single women raising chil-
dren, etc.). Women can autonomously choose to obtain a consented but
unwanted and unwelcome abortion; however, that is a decision they should
not have to make and perhaps would not have to make given a different
environment. Increased social support would enable different choices. The
reasons women give for abortion are suggestive of women’s continued op-
pression and the devaluation of birth, childhood, and caretaking roles.271 By
opting for consented but unwanted and unwelcome abortion, women are
coopted into perpetuating these social ills, bowing to constraints they lack
the power to change.
Autonomous decisions deserve respect. As evidence of autonomy, re-
gret also deserves space and respect within culture, law, and women’s lived
experience. A relational autonomy model can help to create and preserve
this respectful space. Women’s decisions could be more autonomous if legal
regulations supported the decision-making process by enacting “serious
changes in the social circumstances in which the [abortion] choice is
made.”272 Yet, I assert, these choices are still autonomous in a relational
on an instinctual level . . . , or that we wish someone wanted, if only on that same
instinctual level.”).
269. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Ludlow supra note 10, at 27; see generally RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND
CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND
WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2002); RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SU-
SIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2000); DOROTHY ROB-
ERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY (1998).
271. See Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy and Global Threats, in BEING RELATIONAL:
REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 13, 18 (Jocelyn Downie
& Jennifer J. Llewellyn eds., 2012).
272. Id. Sherwin might regard these decisions as an example of agency but not autonomy,
since “agency” refers to decision making in a situation where a person chooses an
option that is most reasonable for her under prevailing conditions but that is incom-
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sense when they are made self-consciously, engaging with others’
perspectives.273
F. Mistake 6: Linking Regret with Moral Culpability
The sixth and final mistake has to do with confusing causal responsi-
bility and moral responsibility. Abortion is not a morally indifferent act,274
and awareness of this is intertwined with the construction of regret as re-
morse, and its links to the maternal-fetal relationship and defective decision
making. Pro-life and pro-choice scripts restrict our conceptions of which
dimensions of abortion are morally problematic, focusing almost exclusively
on the morality of providing abortion while overlooking the moralities of
accessing and delivering abortion.275
Scripts can yoke regret to moral culpability through a dialectic of con-
trol and responsibility—tenets of liberal autonomy and individualism.276
But both “control” and “responsibility” must be deconstructed and
problematized; otherwise, we fail to distinguish between causal and moral
responsibility. Whereas causal responsibility refers to sex as a cause of preg-
nancy, moral responsibility relates to blaming, shaming, or punishing indi-
viduals for their sexual and reproductive decisions.277 Ideally, every woman
would be causally responsible for her abortion because she chose it autono-
mously; assigning causal responsibility does not require one to subjectively
evaluate and assign moral weight to a particular choice. Causal responsibil-
ity merely links the woman’s choice to her abortion decision; one would
have to invoke moral responsibility to label the abortion a mistake and hold
a woman morally culpable through guilt, shame, and punishment.278
While the pro-life script holds women who consent to sex liable for all
consequences, conflating causal and moral responsibility, the pro-choice
script seems to champion causal responsibility to the extent it portrays abor-
tion as a choice, but remains relatively mute on moral responsibility, as
under liberal theory, women must determine abortion’s moral status for
patible with the overall interests of her social group and thus ultimately her own
interests. Id. These decisions are “reasonable for individuals” but “disastrous for
groups.” Id. at 19.
273. See Jennifer Nedelsky, The Reciprocal Relationship of Judgment and Autonomy: Walk-
ing in Another’s Shoes and Which Shoes to Walk In, in BEING RELATIONAL: REFLEC-
TIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW, supra note 271, at 35, 46–54
(explaining the importance of self-consciousness in judgment).
274. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHA-
NASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 34–35 (1993).
275. SHERWIN, supra note 113, at 100.
276. See supra Part I.B.
277. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 205, at 2.
278. Id.
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themselves.279 A more affirmative statement to that effect, however, might
be stronger than silence.
Both causal and moral responsibility flow from control: here, a
woman’s ability to make an alternative choice.280 A person can have “a cer-
tain sort of control without having the sort of control that involves alterna-
tive possibilities.”281 The extent to which one believes causal and moral
responsibility overlap is influenced by our beliefs about the relationship of
sex to pregnancy and biology. Sex is necessary, but not sufficient, for preg-
nancy. Pregnancy, in turn, is arbitrarily determined by myriad factors—
ovulation cycles, gamete quality, uterine lining, body temperature, hormo-
nal levels, and so on.282 While women have control over whether they en-
gage in sex, they do not have that same degree of control over whether they
become pregnant, and the idea that one should exercise “control” over con-
sensual sex through abstinence places too high a burden on adults.283
Women can take the birth control pill or insist their partners use a condom,
but they cannot will the egg not to descend or refuse a sperm permission to
penetrate the egg’s wall. They can take the “morning after” pill, but they
can’t conclusively prevent an embryo from implanting. Women’s success in
attempting to avoid or ensure pregnancy is inherently uncertain.
This is not the sort of control that is traditionally associated with
moral responsibility.284 What “responsibility” exists lies with the laws of na-
ture, because reproduction, like many bodily processes and statuses, is heav-
ily regulated by systems other than our conscious will. This lack of control
decouples causal responsibility from moral responsibility. If sex were both
necessary and sufficient for pregnancy, causal responsibility would generate
moral responsibility. But because it is not, holding someone causally respon-
sible does not mean that they are also morally responsible and does not
justify moral culpability, blame, or punishment.
From this vantage point, the pro-life script’s vision of sexual knowl-
edge, control over consequences, moral responsibility, and the immorality of
terminating fetal life285 is far too narrow. Relational autonomy focuses on a
279. See supra Part I.
280. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 205, at 20.
281. Id. at 32.
282. See generally JEAN M. TWENGE, THE IMPATIENT WOMAN’S GUIDE TO GETTING
PREGNANT (2012).
283. See Appleton, supra note 3, at 295–96.
284. See FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 205, at 21 (noting that we associate control with
moral responsibility).
285. See Maroney, supra note 41, at 893. Maroney observes that women who experience
post-abortion regret define themselves as mothers, their fetuses as children, and abor-
tion as murder. Id. These categories carry a great deal of moral weight for women
who perceive that they, as mothers, have murdered their children. Id.
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more expansive question—whether it is irresponsible, even immoral, to
birth a child one cannot provide for or who will jeopardize one’s ability to
care for others.286 Conceptualizing “responsibility” as carrying a pregnancy
is shortsighted. “Responsibility” starts in pregnancy but continues through
adoption or parenthood; it is a multi-decade, and likely lifelong, process,
not a forty-week fling.287 In this light, abortion becomes “an important
moral or life decision that may be compelled by life circumstances and ex-
isting obligations.”288 Regret, in turn, may indicate “a conflict of responsi-
bilities in which it may be perfectly clear which responsibility prevails—pre-
existing commitment over commitments not yet made—and yet terribly
painful to refuse to accept the new responsibility.”289
G. Decentering Regret, Changing Legal Landscapes
Ironically, correcting all of these conventional regret mistakes would
not yield a “new” model of regret per se. Regret’s current prominence is a
direct consequence of these missteps. Fixing all of these conventional mis-
takes does not help us to reconceptualize regret, it enables us to decenter it.
Regret in and of itself does not merit this much of our time and attention,
but promoting autonomy does. We care so much about regret because it is
currently constructed as inconsistent with or antithetical to autonomy;290
these mistakes are not so much issues of regret as issues of autonomy. These
constructions of regret merely mask autonomy’s significance. Ultimately,
regret is like a pesky knot in the neck muscle; it is painful, but the more you
knead it and work it over, the more readily it should dissipate and eventu-
ally disappear. Autonomy, then, is critical to working through regret.
This project—reconceptualizing and decentering regret and prioritiz-
ing autonomy—has clear normative implications for abortion regulations,
286. According to Greenwood, “one must carefully consider before accepting the respon-
sibilities of a new one,” focusing “not on the fetus as an individual being, but on the
parents’ family.” Greenwood, supra note 268, at 599. Cahn and Carbone provide an
excellent example, stating that the prototypical left or “blue” family was “appalled”
that seventeen-year-old Bristol Palin was pregnant and engaged to the teenage father
because “a 17-year-old, married or not, is not ready for parenthood.” CAHN & CAR-
BONE, supra note 22, at 9. These are not formulated as “overarching moral princi-
ples—thou shalt not have a child for whom one is not prepared to provide optimal
circumstances—but in terms of instrumental values.” Id. at 41; see also Greenwood,
supra note 268, at 599 (noting that it is “immoral—not just inconvenient—to carry
a pregnancy to term when the potential parents are unable or unwilling to then raise
the child properly”).
287. See Greenwood, supra note 268, at 598–99.
288. Id. at 600.
289. Id.
290. See supra Part I.B.
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including public and private abortion funding, waiting periods, mandated
information disclosures, mandated counseling, and spousal and parental no-
tification. While few of these restrictions are entirely supportive or destruc-
tive of autonomy on their face, most can be implemented in several ways,
each of which impact autonomy differently. Relational autonomy evaluates
abortion regulations within a broader context of social institutions and prac-
tices,291 querying whether, how, and when these requirements support rela-
tional autonomy.
Courts have long wrestled with autonomy’s meaning in abortion, how
to balance it against competing interests, and how best to effectuate it.
Abortion jurisprudence cedes this decision to the woman in consultation
with her physician.292 The Roe majority acknowledged pregnancy’s physical
consequences and mental effects—its lived experience—as well as
parenthood’s mental, physical, and emotional burdens.293 Subsequent cases
affirmed women’s authority to choose even as they altered this process by
permitting states to attempt to persuade women otherwise.294 Carhart, how-
ever, forecloses a woman’s choice to undergo a certain procedure and thus
determines, controls, and dominates—and undermines and damages—her
autonomy. Once again, conventional scripts are more of a hindrance than a
help. The pro-life script insists on erecting every possible obstacle to abor-
tion, and the pro-choice script counters by demanding all be eliminated.295
The truth lies in between. People will disagree on how best to effectuate
autonomy; while most Americans favor legal abortion, they disagree on
which restrictions are necessary.296
291. See SHERWIN, supra note 113, at 99.
292. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
293. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
294. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 423
n.5, 445 (1983).
295. See supra Part I.A.
296. For the first time, most Americans favor legal abortion; Gallup polling data from
January 2013 found that 52 percent felt abortion should be legal under certain cir-
cumstances and 69 percent favored twenty-four-hour waiting periods. Ashley Parker,





Bv%2Bwade%2F&_r=0 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). A Pew poll reported that 63
percent opposed completely overturning Roe, results “largely consistent with surveys
taken over the past two decades.” Id.
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This discussion presumes autonomy is our goal—a controversial as-
sumption in and of itself.297 One can promote many other and perhaps
inconsistent values, such as protecting fetal life or giving women complete
freedom of choice. The threshold question is whether we need to assist
women in autonomous decision making (not whether we need to evaluate
it—as in Carhart), and if so, how. In liberal autonomy, needing assistance is
in tension with autonomy; a decision maker seeking help implicitly con-
cedes to a weakness, and the more aid she receives, the more likely her
autonomy is imperiled.298 In relational autonomy, however, individuals can
be more or less autonomous in certain contexts and are encouraged to be-
come more autonomous by consulting others and considering their needs.
Here, assistance can enhance, not impugn, autonomy.299 To say that a
woman is in the best position to make this choice is not to say that she
occupies a perfect or ideal position—the very circumstances of her preg-
nancy are constraints—but to acknowledge that no one else has the author-
ity to make the choice for her.300 Assisting autonomy is a wonderful thing if
it is done well—fairly, respectfully, and accurately.
In America, abortion is an isolated medical procedure. Clinics are dif-
ficult for many to access and procedures may be difficult for many to afford
or banned outright, while other women’s health care services are widely
available.301 This isolation and marginalization evidences a lack of respect
for women’s decisions and autonomy302 as well as the powerful conse-
quences of conventional regret mistakes—confusing regret with remorse, fo-
cusing on the maternal-fetal relationship, and coupling regret to deficient
decision making and moral culpability. Funding abortion only in certain,
rather extraordinary circumstances—saving maternal life or preventing a
“substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function,” rape,
incest, and fetal impairment—intimates that these are the only “good” or
297. Rick Santorum, ‘It Takes a Family’ (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 4, 2005) quoted in
David Boaz, Rick Santorum v. Limited Government, CATO AT LIBERTY (January 2,
2012, 4:09 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/rick-santorum-v-limited-government
(“This whole idea of personal autonomy . . . I don’t think most conservatives hold
that point of view. . . . I think most conservatives understand that individuals can’t
go it alone. That there is no such society that I am aware of, where we’ve had radical
individualism and that it succeeds as a . . . culture.”).
298. See supra Part I.B.
299. See id.
300. SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT, supra note 113, at 101–102.
301. See, e.g., Adam Sonfield, Abortion Clinics and Contraceptive Services: Opportunities
and Challenges, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2 (2011), available at https://www
.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/2/gpr140202.html.
302. See CANNOLD, supra note 240, at xxxiii (stating that the D & X controversy “dis-
plays the public’s—and the politicians’—distrust of women’s capacity to think and
act morally”).
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“morally acceptable” reasons for abortion and that these reasons intersect
with women’s victimization.303 This Section will focus on spousal and pa-
rental notification, mandated informational disclosures, counseling, and
waiting periods.
Under relational autonomy, a woman should be free to value relation-
ships for herself and determine how to use these resources in decision mak-
ing. Requirements that women notify certain individuals impose relational
hierarchies on women, forcing them to include these connections in certain
ways. These regulations reveal lawmakers’ assumptions about which rela-
tionships are most impacted by abortion, which merit attention, and which
may bear upon the abortion decision (implicitly to prevent it). They pass
regulations requiring women to inform spouses and parents, but not unmar-
ried partners, religious leaders, or primary doctors.304 Spousal notification
provisions run counter to relational autonomy by forcing women to priori-
tize certain relationships that are marital305 and overwhelmingly heterosex-
ual306 and to include their partners in certain ways.307 These are exercises in
control and dominance, not respect and empathy. To its credit, the Su-
303. As of February 1, 2013, thirty-two states followed the federal standard of providing
Medicaid funding for abortion in life endangerment, rape and incest. See State Poli-
cies in Brief: State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST., http://
www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf (last updated Feb. 1, 2014).
Eight states restricted private insurance coverage of abortion, but twenty-three states
restrict coverage in plans that will be offered through the insurance exchange under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See State Policies in Brief: Restricting
Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., available at http://www
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last updated Feb. 1, 2014).
304. For example, § 3209 of the Abortion Control Act, the Pennsylvania legislation at
issue in Casey, required married women to notify their husbands of their plans prior
to obtaining an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844
(1992).
305. During oral arguments in Casey, Justice O’Connor asked Ernie Preate, counsel for
the respondent, to confirm that the statutory provision at issue did not require noti-
fication to fathers who were not also husbands, then later asked, “why not require
notice to all fathers?,” terming that portion of the statute “a curious sort of a provi-
sion.” Transcript of Oral Argument at *25–26, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (No. 91–744,
91–902), 1992 WL 691955, at *9.
306. It is less likely, but still possible, that a pregnant woman in a same-sex couple would
have to notify her wife that she intended to get an abortion; her wife, however,
might only have a stake in the abortion decision equivalent to the husband’s if the
couple had undergone IVF, with the non-pregnant wife providing the egg.
307. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (“It
seems manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a pregnancy should be one
concurred in by both the wife and her husband. No marriage may be viewed as
harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on so
important and vital an issue.”).
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preme Court has recognized that notification cannot ensure marital
harmony.308
Research suggests, however, that women find most relations support-
ive. While Casey highlights the “one percent of women” who were pregnant
and in abusive marital relationships, the majority opinion states the “vast
majority” of women consult their husbands about the decision.309 In one
recent study, nearly all women seeking abortion had told someone their
decision, that in 82 percent of cases women had told their male partners,
that in 87 percent of the cases where women told their partners the partners
were supportive of their decision, and that fewer than 1 percent of women
cite pressure from a partner or parent as the most important reason for their
abortion.310
In some ways, however, spousal notifications are relational; they recog-
nize men have a different relationship to abortion than women and that
men ascribe varying degrees of biological and emotional import to the
choice and to the fetus.311 Spousal notification requirements may falsely pre-
sume the husband’s interest is protective and that his intent is to delay or
prevent the abortion, not compel it. Abortion case law references the “de-
voted and protective”312 husband’s interest in fetal safety.313
The question of spousal notification was largely settled in Casey, which
found it unconstitutional because of its tragic implications for women in
abusive marriages.314 Lawmakers, however, have not implemented other
more useful relational supports beyond notification, such as prenatal child
support. Regulations could permit a pregnant woman to establish paternity
through amniocentesis,315 and require biological fathers to provide prenatal
308. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71 (“[I]t is difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutu-
ality and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the marital relationship and the
marriage institution, will be achieved by giving the husband a veto power exercisable
for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all.”).
309. Casey, 505 U.S. at 888, 894.
310. Diane Greene Foster et al., Attitudes and Decision Making Among Women Seeking
Abortions at One U.S. Clinic, 44 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 118, 121
(2012).
311. This is a useful endeavor, we do not want to focus only on the “problematic con-
struction of women as reproductive decisionmakers [and] . . . leave unexplored the
construction of men as reproductive decisionmakers—the implied but essential an-
tithesis that shapes the stereotype.” Appleton, supra note 3, at 324–25.
312. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
313. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.
314. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 897–98.
315. See VICTOR A. BERNSTAM, CRC HANDBOOK OF GENE LEVEL DIAGNOSTICS IN
CLINICAL PRACTICE 76 (1992) (explaining that molecular genetic fingerprinting is a
“simple, reliable, and accurate method for prenatal paternity testing when performed
on material routinely obtained at amniocentesis, or on chorionic villus samples”).
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child support. This perhaps would conflict with liberal opposition to legal
regulations forcing pregnant women to act so as to avoid harming fetuses
(e.g., forced C-sections).316 Under current schemes, women are part of the
maternal-fetal relationship from conception, but men are fathers only after
birth and a paternity test.317
Parental notification318 raises many of these same issues, though judi-
cial bypass319 theoretically allows minors to remove parental relationships
from their decision-making processes. However, parental notification also
raises different concerns. Minors’ autonomous capacity is different from
adults’, and some minors will be too immature to make this decision alone
and even to seek help.320 In addition, parental notification regulations often
require “evaluating” the minor’s autonomy according to criteria such as in-
telligence and emotional stability—guidelines that are subjective, hard to
apply, and sometimes must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.321
Relational autonomy helps ensure that a minor knows the consequences—
physical, emotional, and relational—of abortion, and acknowledges that fit
parents will ideally be part of the decision-making process. Judicial bypass
procedures can support relational autonomy as do exceptions for minors in
medical emergencies or non-supportive parental relationships characterized
by abuse, assault, incest, and neglect. Yet much evidence suggests these pro-
ceedings can be forums for assigning moral culpability and voyeurism, re-
quiring minors to disclose intensely personal details to a complete
316. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
317. However, in most states, women can recover prenatal expenses not paid by insurance
through retroactive child support or some other mechanism. See, e.g, DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 13, § 513(a)(3) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.712.2(1)
(West 2012).
318. As of February 1, 2013, thirty-eight states required parental involvement in a mi-
nor’s abortion decision (most often that one parent be notified or provide consent),
and thirty-seven of these states had an alternative judicial bypass procedure. See State
Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf (last updated Feb. 1,
2014).
319. Judicial bypass laws allow minors to obtain abortions without parental involvement.
See generally Alexandra Rex, Note, Protecting the One Percent: Relevant Women, Undue
Burdens, and Unworkable Judicial Bypasses, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 85 (2014).
320. See generally Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Mi-
nors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64
AM. PSYCHOL. 583 (2009).
321. State Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 318.
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stranger.322 Minors can find bypass hearings stressful, even traumatic, and
are unlikely to find them helpful in their decision-making processes.323
In a related vein, one pro-life organization, Americans United for Life,
has recently proposed model legislation as part of its “Women’s Protection
Project” that would allow third parties to sue providers, clinics, and state
officials for emotional damages from abortions.324 Significantly, the legisla-
tion leaves undefined the “person” who may seek redress, including family
members or even unrelated parties. Among other invidious effects, such as
suborning the provider-patient relationship, this legislation is a blatant at-
tempt to not only bankrupt providers but also to create standing for others
to assert emotional distress claims and thus to act upon a fetal “relation-
ship.” Of course, partners, children, family members, friends, and even
larger groups can all potentially assert various “relationships” with women’s
fetuses such that something is at stake if women abort. Optimally, women
would determine how best to weigh each claim. But there is currently a clear
and judicially recognized325 difference between those connections and le-
gally protected relations that grant a party standing to take part in or recover
damages as a result of the abortion decision. Like spousal and parental noti-
fication laws, this model legislation effects an end run around women’s
judgments about who should be involved in the abortion decision and how,
effectively rendering women invisible by allowing others to assert and act
upon fetal “relations.” Again, women themselves are the best judges of what
relations are most important and merit consideration.
Mandatory waiting periods, counseling, and informational disclo-
sures326 are ostensibly enacted to protect the ingredients of autonomous de-
cision making: time, information, and a chance to speak to a neutral expert.
However, many kinds of regulations effectively obstruct or misinform
women’s decisions, rather than support them. A twenty-four-hour waiting
period does not seem to undermine women’s autonomy on its face, pro-
322. See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy,
18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 305, 308–315 (2006); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity:
Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 409, 433–437 (2009) [hereinafter Sanger, Decisional Dignity].
323. Sanger, Decisional Dignity, supra note 322, at 447–450. See generally J. SHOSHANNA
EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES?: THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF TEENS 130–37 (2006).
324. AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, WOMEN’S PROTECTION PROJECT 79–83 (2013), available at
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/WWP-full.pdf (discussing en-
forcement options for state abortion laws); see also Jessica Mason Pieklo, New Model
Laws Would Let Third Parties Sue for Emotional Damages from Abortions, RH REALITY
CHECK (Dec. 10, 2013, 4:56 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/12/10/new
-model-laws-would-let-third-parties-sue-for-emotional-damages-from-abortions/.
325. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895–96 (1992)
(stating that woman need not notify her husband before obtaining an abortion).
326. See supra note 318.
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vided there are emergency exceptions. In practice, however, waiting periods
can be harmful, as when clinic scarcity requires women to either make mul-
tiple long-distance journeys to abortion clinics or stay overnight.327 An alter-
native would be to allow women to access counseling and mandated
information disclosures at more convenient locations like women’s health
clinics or, optimally, their homes.
Similarly, counseling and mandated informational disclosures328 do
not inherently undermine women’s autonomy; the problem lies in their im-
plementation. Counseling may support relational autonomy when it is op-
tional and the counselor is truly unbiased. Similarly, information disclosures
can support relational autonomy when scientifically accurate, objective, and
presented neutrally. Unbiased information covering standard procedural de-
tails and risks is normally part of informed consent, and additional informa-
tion—e.g., telling women that they cannot be coerced into choosing
abortion—may prove helpful to some. However, information disclosures
undermine autonomy when their content is derived from junk science or is
presented as emotionally inflammatory.329 These practices mislead, empha-
size negative information, distract from pertinent issues, and perpetuate
conventional regret mistakes (conflating regret with remorse/pathological
distress and narrowly focusing on the maternal-fetal relationship). For in-
stance, women should not be informed that “regret” is a “serious psycholog-
ical effect” akin to depression in state-mandated abortion counseling.330
Information on personhood can also be problematic if it is described in
isolationist, liberal autonomy terms (e.g., the fetus is a unique and separate
person); under relational autonomy, personhood is a social category involv-
ing personality, communal interaction, and biological integrity.331 Harmful
information disclosures and counseling alike transform a supportive care
provider relationship into a propaganda opportunity and undermine trust in
providers.332 Moreover, mandated disclosures, like waiting periods, should
327. Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Man-
date Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 31–33 (2012).
328. See supra note 326.
329. See generally Vandewalker, supra note 327, at 13–33.
330. Dadlez & Andrews, supra note 172, at 447 (quoting M. Hinojosa, NOW Transcript
– Show 329, PBS (July 20, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/329.html) (re-
porting women are told that “(s)ome women have reported serious psychological
effects . . . including depression, grief, anxiety, lowered self-esteem, regret, suicidal
thoughts . . . ”).
331. SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT, supra note 113.
332. See, e.g., Deborah J. Oyer, Letter to the Editor, Playing Politics with the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, NEW ENG. J. MED. (June 14, 2012), http://www.nejm.org/doi/
full/10.1056/NEJMc1205009. Oyer observes:
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be used to actually encourage reflection and not as opportunities for harass-
ment, and should be made as accessible and convenient as possible.
CONCLUSION
So many aspects of women’s lived abortion experience are mediated by
or experienced in terms of relationships, which are in turn encapsulated by
scripts. For all they smooth our social interactions, social scripts and emo-
tion feeling rules also have negative consequences; one might say their
strength is their weakness. While these heuristics help us to conceptualize
and evaluate actors, decisions, emotional stakes, and outcomes, they often
do so by rendering them black and white. When we are socialized by these
scripts and unconsciously apply them, we also come to see individuals and
issues as black and white. These simplified constructions have placed new
and unwelcome constraints on women’s reproductive freedoms: the freedom
to feel certain emotions and recognize their role in decision making, the
freedom to acknowledge the relationality of one’s decision-making
processes, and the freedom to make difficult decisions the way one feels they
should be made.
This is not to say we should (or could) rid ourselves of such heuristic
shortcuts. Such a task would be tilting at windmills.333 Like emotion, social
scripts play an inevitable and potentially useful role in decision making even
as they inherently constrain it. Instead, we must critically deconstruct these
scripts and confront their most problematic assumptions and representa-
tions. We must recognize that scripts and feeling rules are not objective and
immutable but subjective cultural constructions perpetually in flux. A rela-
tional perspective ensures a more expansive and visible social space to
women’s voices and bodies and greater respect for their experience. We are
more likely to be citizens among social scripts than subjects of them. Our
goal should not be to reconcile the pro-life and pro-choice perspectives but
rather to challenge their narrowness and absolutism, both making room for
women’s lived experiences and rendering it more difficult for advocates on
both sides to “proffer simplistic solutions.”334 These new, more complex
scripts could situate abortion as a type of mothering decision within a more
Many laws have undermined the doctor—patient relationship—mandating
that doctors say things to patients that are blatantly untrue, requiring that
specific tests be performed whether the doctor thinks they are necessary or
not, and requiring waiting periods regardless of whether the woman and her
doctor think she is confident in her decision.
Id.
333. See MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE 58–64 (Edith Grossman trans., 2005).
334. Ludlow, supra note 10, at 28–29.
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inclusive continuum and reconcile compassion for women with concern for
fetuses.335
The idea that regret may be felt not only following decisions made
wrongly but also after decisions made rightly—including those where a
woman must choose the least objectionable of several bad options—illus-
trates why regret is a perilous frame through which to view reproductive
decision making. Individuals and institutions with political, social, and cul-
tural capital make use of regret to draw conclusions and support judgments
about the (im)morality and (ir)rationality of a woman’s decision to obtain
an abortion. Regret inevitably piggybacks upon individual beliefs about
these issues; as Maroney notes, “[a]bsent a set of beliefs identifying the abor-
tion as a grave moral harm marking her as an extremely bad actor, she is not
likely to regret the abortion but rather the circumstances surrounding or
necessitating it.”336
If “regret reveals the importance of self-knowledge to self-defini-
tion,”337 relationality illustrates that self-knowledge and self-definition are
not just introspective processes but social processes mediated by relation-
ships. Regret, like any other emotional response, is “shaped by and respon-
sive to the estimations and responses of others.”338 It seems problematic to
advise women they should consider only certain relationships (to the fetus,
to the self) and only in particular ways (prioritizing one while deemphasiz-
ing the other). But this is exactly how we are socialized.
Thus, regret may be an “especially unsuitable yardstick” for gauging
whether a decision has been autonomously made.339 We strive to make deci-
sions in ways we judge will maximize well-being for ourselves and/or others,
not to avoid regret per se.340 Although avoiding regret is ideally a conse-
quence of making decisions that maximize well-being, we will inevitably
make some mistakes. Usually, regret is not incapacitating; it is not as if
“experiencing regret . . . [is] so bad for a person, and so ruinous, that abso-
lutely ensuring its avoidance is a consideration which trumps all other rea-
sons in favour of a course of conduct.”341
A relational model helps us to focus on autonomy and understand
how various socialization mediums—social scripts, jurisprudential rulings,
and regulatory climates—create an oppressive environment and impair au-
335. Id. at 43.
336. Maroney, supra note 41, at 898.
337. MacKenzie, supra note 72, at 140.
338. Id.
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340. Id. at 710–11.
341. Id.
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tonomy.342 In abortion decision making, women are impacted on multiple
levels. Current abortion scripts handicap socialization; yet without effective
socialization we cannot develop, exercise, and utilize our imaginative/crea-
tive skills and abilities to make autonomous decisions. This in turn under-
mines our ability to identify and consider options and decision-making
strategies. We must be mindful, however, lest we confuse autonomous deci-
sions with perfect decisions. We “must acknowledge that women will some-
times make mistakes in moral judgment.”343 But these women will receive
much more social support in a culture embracing relationality than in one
that does not. Most importantly, relational autonomy steps away from
domination and control, affirming that the probability that mistakes will be
made does not give us the authority to overrule women’s autonomous judg-
ments and decisions. It focuses not on invidious either/or distinctions—
black/white, pro-life/pro-choice—but on the both/and, the in-between, the
shades of gray comprising lived experience.
342. Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy Refigured, in RELATIONAL AUTON-
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supra note 57, at 22.
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